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THE BERGDAHL BLOCK: HOW THE MILITARY LIMITS
PUBLIC ACCESS TO PRELIMINARY HEARINGS AND
WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT
Eric R. Carpenter*
ABSTRACT
Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl and Private First Class Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning
have something in common. Military officials unlawfully closed all or portions of their
preliminary hearings to the public. When doing so, military officials exploited two un-
usual features of the military justice system, thereby denying the accused and the media
of their respective Sixth Amendment and First Amendment rights to a public hearing.
The first feature is that the military justice system does not include a standing
trial-level court. If there is a problem at the preliminary hearing, the accused and
media have nowhere to go for help. The accused and the media must file a writ peti-
tion with a military appellate court to vindicate their rights. This leads to the second
feature: these courts routinely find that they do not have jurisdiction to hear these
claims. And when these courts deny the writ petitions, the accused and the media are
left without an effective remedy. Recognizing this, military officials now block access
to these hearings by mischaracterizing these challenges as Freedom of Information
Act requests. They then tell the accused and the media to seek relief using the rights
provided under that law, knowing none will be coming anytime soon.
Using the Bergdahl case as context, this Article describes this blocking maneuver.
It then exposes the flawed reasoning that military appellate courts use when refusing
to hear these constitutional claims. Finally, this Article offers legislative and regula-
tory fixes to ensure public access to these hearings.
Now is the time for change. In the last three years, Congress and the President
have made significant changes to the military justice system. These changes have
come in large part because the public lost trust and confidence in the military justice
system. Transparency fosters trust and confidence. The more the public knows about
what is considered at a preliminary hearing, the more trust and confidence the public
will have in the commander’s prosecutorial decision based on that hearing, and, ulti-
mately, in the overall role of commanders in the military justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 2009, Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl walked away from his remote
observation post in Paktika Province, Afghanistan.1 Shortly after, he was captured
by hostile forces and remained in enemy hands until May 31, 2014, when he was
returned to American control in exchange for five Taliban detainees who were being
held at Guantanamo Bay.2 Those who were outraged by the prisoner swap, including
then–Presidential candidate Donald Trump, advanced the narrative that Bergdahl
was a coward and that six brave Americans died looking for him.3 Bergdahl was
subsequently charged in the military justice system with desertion and endangering
his unit before the enemy.4
1 A Timeline of Bowe Bergdahl’s 5 Years in Captivity, BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO, http://
boisestatepublicradio.org/topic/timeline-bowe-bergdahls-5-years-captivity#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/ED9L-95X2] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018); see also Alex Horton, Bowe
Bergdahl Should Spend 14 Years in Prison and Lose His Medical Benefits, Army Says,
WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017
/11/02/bowe-bergdahl-should-spend-14-years-in-prison-and-lose-his-medical-benefits-army
-says/?utm_term=.813082365b35 [https://perma.cc/4JSZ-MV6X].
2 See A Timeline of Bowe Bergdahl’s 5 Years in Captivity, supra note 1.
3 Editorial, The Soldier Donald Trump Called a Traitor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016),
https://nyti.ms/2g3Sq7h.
4 Jim Michaels, Army Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl Pleads Guilty to Desertion and Misbehavior
Before the Enemy, USA TODAY (Oct. 16, 2017, 10:27 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story
2018] THE BERGDAHL BLOCK 791
In an effort to divert the case from the most serious form of court-martial,
Bergdahl’s defense team worked to counter this narrative. During the military pre-
liminary hearing, the defense sought the public release of two unclassified docu-
ments that had been admitted into evidence: the transcript of Bergdahl’s statement
given to an investigating officer, and the executive summary of that officer’s inves-
tigative report.5 These documents included information that Bergdahl’s mental health
problems caused him to leave his base, rather than cowardice; that he acted admira-
bly while in captivity; and that no one died looking for him.6 With that information
made public, legitimate public pressure might be brought to bear on the command-
ing officer who was charged with making the prosecutorial decision in his case.
Despite many requests, military officials refused to release the documents, telling
the accused and the media to seek relief under the Freedom of Information Act7
(FOIA).8 The preliminary hearing officer also refused to make those documents pub-
lic, saying he lacked the authority to release the documents because of an earlier order
by a commander who had authority over the case.9 The defense and the media then
filed writ petitions with a military appellate court asking that court to order the release
of the reports.10 However, that court then found it did not have jurisdiction to issue the
writs and agreed with the government’s position that Bergdahl and the media should
seek relief through FOIA.11 The documents remained hidden from public view.12
/news/world/2017/10/16/army-sgt-bowe-bergdahl-pleads-guilty-desertion-and-misbehavior
-before-enemy/767320001/ [https://perma.cc/D48T-YXGK]. Bergdahl’s experience was
extensively covered in the second season of the Serial podcast. See generally Serial: Season
Two (2015–2016), https://serialpodcast.org/season-two [https://perma.cc/J5UH-R6BL].
5 Record of Preliminary Hearing Under Article 32 at 17, 228, United States v. Bergdahl
(Ft. Bragg Sept. 17, 2015), https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/09/Sanitized
%20Article%2032%20Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/3E63-UDRQ]; see also Transcript
of Sergeant Bergdahl’s Interview with Major General Kenneth R. Dahl, United States v.
Bergdahl (Joint Base San Antonio Aug. 6, 2014), https://bergdahldocket.files.wordpress
.com/2016/03/stmt20of20accused202014_redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/V422-CWUJ] [here-
inafter Bergdahl Interview Transcript].
6 See Michael Ames, What the Army Doesn’t Want You to Know About Bowe Bergdahl,
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2016, 6:01 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/05/serial-bowe
-bergdahl-mystery-pow-419962.html [https://perma.cc/HLR5-2NP3]. See generally Bergdahl
Interview Transcript, supra note 5.
7 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
8 Request Denied to Make Bergdahl Interrogation Public, CBS DFW (Oct. 8, 2015,
6:45 PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2015/10/08/request-denied-to-make-bergdahl-interrogation
-public/ [https://perma.cc/F9FW-XESC].
9 See discussion infra Part III.
10 Hearst Newspapers, LLC v. Abrams, ARMY MISC 20150652, 2015 WL 6119474 (A.
Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (per curiam).
11 See id.; Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Oct. 8, 2015).
12 The Serial producers eventually received a copy of the investigative report. Sarah
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How can that happen? How can the military deny the accused and the public
access to unclassified documents admitted at a preliminary hearing? The accused has
a Sixth Amendment right and the media have a First Amendment right to an open
military preliminary hearing.13 And, if transparency in criminal proceedings is ever
of value, certainly it must be in cases like this, where the public is unfamiliar with the
military justice system and may question its fairness. The more the public knows
about what is considered at a preliminary hearing and what the commander relied
upon when making his or her prosecutorial decision, the more trust and confidence
the public will have in the commander’s decision—and ultimately, the role of com-
manders in making these prosecutorial decisions.
Yet time and again, when the military has a case in the national spotlight, we see
that military officials will close portions of the preliminary hearing and then the
accused or the media (or both) have to litigate to get the hearing opened.14 This hap-
pened when the military court-martialed the senior-most enlisted member in the
Army, Sergeant Major Gene McKinney, for sexual misconduct.15 And it happened
when the military court-martialed Private First Class Bradley (now Chelsea) Man-
ning for leaking classified information to WikiLeaks.16
One reason we keep seeing these closures is that military officials do not have
the option of using a secretive proceeding like a grand jury.17 To take cases to a
felony-level court-martial, military officials must use open preliminary hearings.18
If military officials want to keep some information secret, they must try to close or
partially close those hearings, and the tests they must satisfy are pretty onerous.19
Sometimes the tests are not very difficult, like when the government needs to
protect classified material or private information about a sexual assault victim.20
Unfortunately, sometimes military officials cannot satisfy the tests for some infor-
mation but close the hearing anyway, or they can satisfy the tests but close way too
Koenig, Was Anyone Killed Looking for Bowe Bergdahl? Some Hard Evidence, at Long Last
(Oct. 6, 2016, 12:45 PM), SERIAL, https://serialpodcast.org/posts/2016/10/was-anyone-killed
-looking-for-bowe-bergdahl-some-hard-evidence-at-long-last [https://perma.cc/8RCX
-ASEJ]. The report found that no one died looking for Bergdahl. See id. However, three ser-
vice members appear to have been wounded looking for him. Government Brief Regarding
the Admissibility Evidence of Injuries During Presentencing, Motion to Recognize Victims
Under Article 6b, UCMJ, and for Reconsideration at 1–4, United States v. Bergdahl (Ft. Bragg
June 6, 2017), https://bergdahldocket.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/g-app-81.pdf [https://perma
.cc/UQZ2-AGP4] (discussing the admissibility of evidence of injuries during presentencing).
13 See discussion infra Parts IV–V.
14 See, e.g., supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part VI.
15 See ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 364 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
16 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
17 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012 &
Supp. IV 2016)).
18 See id.
19 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 405(i)(4) (2016).
20 See id.
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much of the hearing.21 Until recently, when military officials did that, military appel-
late courts held them accountable by granting writ petitions. In the McKinney case, for
example, a military appellate court ordered the military officials to follow the rules.22
Since that case, though, the Supreme Court issued an opinion, Clinton v.
Goldsmith,23 that has made military appellate courts risk-averse about exercising
jurisdiction over these writ petitions. With waning appellate oversight, it now ap-
pears that military officials can close these proceedings without fear that they will
be reversed while the proceeding is underway.24
The military can now run the Bergdahl Block. Military officials can mischaracterize
this constitutional, open trial rights problem as an access to government information
problem. Military officials can then deny the request to open the hearing, tell the
accused and the media that they need to submit a FOIA request, and wait months for
that request to be processed, and if that request is denied, to go litigate in an Article
III court. Military officials did just that to Bergdahl and the media covering his case.25
Military officials can run that play without concern that they will be held immedi-
ately accountable for ignoring the rules related to open trial rights.26 They can take ad-
vantage of two quirks of the military justice system. First, the military justice system
does not include standing trial-level courts that can supervise the preliminary hearings
and immediately resolve these issues.27 Instead, the accused or the media have to apply
for a writ from a military appellate court to seek any relief.28 Second, the military ap-
pellate courts have very limited jurisdiction.29 And now, following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Goldsmith, those courts will likely find (after using faulty reasoning) that
they do not have jurisdiction.30 The hearing then comes to an end without any relief.
21 See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 366 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (“Here, the SPCMCA
decided to close the entire proceeding for unsubstantiated reasons.”).
22 Id.
23 526 U.S. 529, 534–37 (1999).
24 See, e.g., Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Oct. 8, 2015); Hearst Newspapers, LLC v. Abrams, ARMY MISC 20150652, 2015 WL
6119474 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (per curiam).
25 See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.
26 See Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 534–37. See generally Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401;
Hearst Newspapers, 2015 WL 6119474.
27 See discussion infra Part II.
28 10 U.S.C. § 806b(e)(1), (3) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016).
29 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66(c) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012)) (out-
lining the courts of criminal appeal); Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67(c) (codified
at 10 U.S.C. § 867(c) (2012)) (describing the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces).
30 See discussion infra Part VI. This move is not available in the federal system. If a fed-
eral magistrate closes a preliminary hearing, the affected party can refer the issue to the
standing district court, and that court would have jurisdiction over both the defendant’s claim
and the media’s claim. See discussion infra Part I. And if a party sought a writ based on the
district court’s ruling, the federal appellate courts would have jurisdiction over both claims.
See discussion infra Part I.
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That is what happened in Bergdahl’s case. The Army Court of Criminal Appeals
found that it did not have jurisdiction over the writ petitions and the hearing came
to an end without the public gaining access to those documents.31 The play worked
beautifully. Subsequently, a military commander referred Bergdahl’s case to the most
serious type of court-martial.32
The good news—for the accused, at least—is that if military appellate courts
apply the correct reasoning, the accused should be able to seek relief from a military
appellate court. The block should fail. Proper analysis shows that military appellate
courts have jurisdiction over an accused’s writ.33 Fortunately, because the Army court’s
opinion was unpublished, the correct reasoning has not yet been foreclosed.34 In an
effort to prevent that bad reasoning from ever becoming law, this Article will closely
analyze the Army court’s reasoning and contrast it with the appropriate reasoning.
The bad news—for the media, at least—is that under current case law, courts-
martial and military appellate courts lack jurisdiction to hear their claims.35 When
the media files a petition by itself, the block will work.36 To provide a meaningful
avenue for relief for the media, we need to change the underlying statutory and regu-
latory framework.
Congress should amend the language of Article 17 (the statute that governs the
general jurisdiction of a courts-martial)37 and Article 32 (the statute that governs the
preliminary hearing)38 to give courts-martial jurisdiction over claims brought by the
media so they can vindicate their open trial rights. Congress should also amend
Articles 6639 and 6740 (the statutes that define the military appellate courts’ jurisdic-
tion) to include subject matter and appellate jurisdiction over claims brought by the
media related to their open trial rights at these hearings. And when implementing the
new Article 140a41 (a statute designed to force the President to come up with pro-
cedures to provide victims, counsel, and members of the public access to unsealed
court-martial documents), the President should include procedures for releasing all
documents related to the preliminary hearing.
31 See generally Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401; Hearst Newspapers, 2015 WL 6119474.
32 See Bergdahl Heading for Harsher General Court-Martial, CBS NEWS (Dec. 14, 2015,
2:25 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sgt-bowe-bergdahl-harsher-general-court-martial/
[https://perma.cc/ZL3V-VCA5].
33 See discussion infra Part IV.
34 See generally Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401.
35 See discussion infra Part V.
36 See discussion infra Part V.
37 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 17 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 817 (2012)).
38 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832 (2012 & Supp.
IV 2016)).
39 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2012)).
40 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 867 (2012)).
41 Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5504, 130 Stat. 2894, 2961–62.
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Congress should also allow military judges to take on the role of a standing
court for preliminary hearing issues, to include open trial issues. Military judges
should be able to hear the issues as they arise and provide at least one level of con-
temporaneous oversight of a military official’s decision to close a hearing.
This Article starts by setting up the basic federal framework that would be used
if this were a civilian case.42 Next, this Article describes those portions of the military
system43 that impact this problem and points out the consequential differences: no
grand jury, no standing court, and limited jurisdiction.44 To provide the last of the
information needed for us to analyze this problem, the Article then describes the
facts of Bergdahl’s hearing closure.45
The Article then turns to the deeper analysis, describing the accused’s robust
public trial rights at the preliminary hearing, providing the correct analysis for issuing
writs when those rights are denied, and demonstrating that military appellate courts
can issue writs on behalf of the accused.46 Then, the Article looks to the media’s
rights but recognizes that under current military case law, courts-martial and military
appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to hear their claims.47 The Article then looks
at how the Army Court of Criminal Appeals handled the issue and criticizes that rea-
soning (as it relates to the accused) so that it will not be used again.48 
Last, the Article provides solutions to this problem.49
I. THE BASIC FEDERAL FRAMEWORK
To provide a framework that we can then compare with the military’s justice
system, we will look at the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and the media’s
First Amendment right to an open trial in the civilian system.50 Once that is developed,
we will look, in the abstract, at how a defendant or the media would appeal a limi-
tation of those rights within the federal system.51
42 See infra Part I.
43 The Uniform Code of Military Justice, along with the Manual for Courts-Martial, are
undergoing rapid and substantial change. The National Defense Authorization Acts for 2014
and 2015 brought significant changes. See MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., REPORT OF THE
MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GROUP—PART I: UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS 20–23 (2015) [here-
inafter UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS]. Further, the Military Justice Act of 2016 will bring about
what are arguably the most significant changes to the military justice system since its creation.
See Military Justice Act, §§ 5001–5542. The very recent changes do not impact the substan-
tive analysis used in this Article. For ease of future reference, I will cite to the current version
of the law or rule unless the older rule somehow impacts the analysis.
44 See discussion infra Part II.
45 See discussion infra Part III.
46 See discussion infra Part IV.
47 See discussion infra Part V.
48 See discussion infra Part VI.
49 See discussion infra Conclusion and Solutions.
50 See discussion infra Section I.A.
51 See discussion infra Section I.A.
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A. Open Trial Rights
In civilian criminal trials, the accused has a Sixth Amendment right to a public
trial.52 As the law first developed, the accused held the right to the public trial and could
ask that the trial be closed,53 but it is now clear that the public has a First Amendment
right to an open trial that is separate from the accused’s Sixth Amendment right.54
Both rights are means toward a common end—a fair trial55: “The public trial is a
‘safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution. The
knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum
of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.’”56
An initial question is whether a preliminary hearing even counts as part of the
trial. The Supreme Court has said that it does, at least in the context of the public’s
First Amendment right to attend.57 The proceeding functions much like a full-scale
trial,58 the proceeding has traditionally been open,59 and public access plays a sig-
nificant role in the process (by restraining possible government abuse, for example).60
Some features of a preliminary hearing are different than those found in a trial:
it does not result in a conviction, and it is conducted before a magistrate rather than
a judge and jury.61 But the Court has said that these distinctions do not matter. Those
features
do not make public access any less essential to the proper func-
tioning of the proceedings . . . . Because of its extensive scope,
the preliminary hearing is often the final and most important step
in the criminal proceeding. . . . [T]he preliminary hearing in
52 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
53 See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379 (1979); PAUL MARCUS ET AL., THE
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT: TRIALS, PRESENTATION OF EVI-
DENCE, AND CONFRONTATION 31 (2d ed. 2016).
54 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
55 See Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 7.
56 MARCUS ET AL., supra note 53, at 33 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948)).
57 See Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 13. The reasoning used in the context of the public’s First
Amendment context applies equally as well to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.
58 The accused has already been charged, the hearing is used to evaluate the weight of
the evidence, and the hearing includes the presentation of evidence and cross-examination
of witnesses. Id. at 12.
59 Id. at 10 (“From Burr until the present day, the near uniform practice of state and fed-
eral courts has been to conduct preliminary hearings in open court.” (analyzing United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 1 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692))).
60 Id. at 12–13.
61 See, e.g., id. at 12.
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many cases provides “the sole occasion for public observation
of the criminal justice system.”62
Importantly, precisely because the hearing might be the final stage of the criminal
process, the rights attach.63 The fact that there may never be a trial is a reason for
attaching the rights to the proceeding, not for disconnecting them.64
Contrast preliminary hearings to federal grand juries, where the rights do not
attach.65 Those proceedings have traditionally been closed and opening them would
frustrate the very purpose of having closed proceedings.66 For example, law enforce-
ment might be investigating ongoing criminal activity and by opening the grand jury,
the suspect would learn that he or she is being observed.67 That concern does not
exist in preliminary hearings, where the defendant is now fully aware that law en-
forcement is on to him or her.68 Records of federal grand jury proceedings remain
confidential “to the extent and as long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized
disclosure of a matter occurring before a grand jury.”69 To find out what happened
at a grand jury, journalists often use the state’s sunshine laws or request access to
the documents once they become part of the trial record.70
The next relevant question is when can trials (including preliminary hearings)
be closed. Hearings can be closed when the party seeking closure “advances an
overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced.”71 The analysis for closing trials
is the same regardless of which right is invoked—the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right or the public’s First Amendment right.72 Closure must be essential to preserv-
ing that overriding interest,73 must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest,74 and
reasonable alternatives to closure must be considered.75
When the defendant is moving to close a preliminary hearing, he is often con-
cerned that evidence introduced at the hearing would otherwise be inadmissible at
trial, and if the media reports on that evidence, the publicity of that inadmissible
62 Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting San Jose Mercury-News v. Municipal Court,
638 P.2d 655, 663 (Cal. 1982)).
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See, e.g., Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).
66 See, e.g., Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 8–9; Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222–23.
67 Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 8–9.
68 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1.
69 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(6).
70 REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, SECRET JUSTICE: GRAND JURIES 3,
6–7 (2004) [hereinafter REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM].
71 Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 7 (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984)).
72 See, e.g., MARCUS ET AL., supra note 53, at 34–38.
73 Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 13–14.
74 Id.
75 Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Waller, 467 U.S.
at 48).
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evidence will taint the jury pool.76 When the defendant seeks closure, the party op-
posing the closure will likely be the media.77 In contrast, when the government seeks
closure, that is often because it wishes to protect sensitive information, like classi-
fied information or personal information about witnesses or victims.78 In those cases,
the defendant or the media (or both) might seek relief.
In the federal system, the power to conduct preliminary hearings has been dele-
gated from the district courts to magistrate judges.79 In the abstract, if a magistrate
judge decided to close a portion of a preliminary hearing, a party could ask the appro-
priate district court to reconsider that ruling.80 The district court would likely treat
the magistrate judge’s decision as nondispositive, meaning the district court would
review that ruling under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard.81 If the
district court denied the party’s request for reconsideration, that ruling would be sub-
ject to the writ analysis discussed in the next section.82
In reality, it is very unlikely that a party will ever file a writ petition to open a fed-
eral preliminary hearing. If the government has sensitive information that it does not
want made public, the government will simply use the grand jury to get an indict-
ment rather than file a complaint that triggers the need for a preliminary hearing.83
In those situations where the government does need to file a complaint (because of
an on-scene arrest, for example), the government will likely use its negotiating power
to seek a waiver from the defendant of the preliminary hearing.84
So, we will not see the equivalent of a Bergdahl Block in the federal system. But
by fully understanding the civilian writ model, we will be able to see where the mili-
tary model differs and why this closure scenario keeps recurring in high-profile
military courts-martial.
76 See, e.g., Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 5; Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
378–79 (1979).
77 See, e.g., Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 3–6 (discussing the procedural history of the case).
78 See MARCUS ET AL., supra note 53, at 34–35.
79 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a). Magistrates are legislative judges that derive their power and
jurisdiction from the district courts, as outlined in the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 28
U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012).
80 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
81 Id. § 636(b)(1)(A).
82 See discussion infra Section I.B.
83 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(2). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not contain
explicit rules for handling classified information at a preliminary hearing. See generally id.
The procedures for handling classified information only apply after indictment. Classified
Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2 (2012); see also REPORTERS COMMITTEE
FOR FREEDOM, supra note 70, at 3–4, 6–7.
84 If the defendant seeks to close the preliminary hearing, the Department of Justice has
a policy to oppose that closure: essentially, the Department will take the side of the media
even if no media is present to litigate its rights. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.9 (2018). In those circum-
stances, conceivably the government could lose its request for reconsideration with the district
court and file a writ with the appellate court. See discussion infra Section I.B.
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B. All Writs Act
If the district court denies the party’s request for reconsideration, the party can
petition for a writ of mandamus.85 A party seeking relief from an appellate court under
the All Writs Act86 must show two things: first, that the appellate court has jurisdiction;
and second, that the writ is necessary and appropriate.87 The first prong relates to
whether a court can issue a writ, whereas the second relates to whether a court should.
Looking at the first prong, Article III courts have broad subject matter jurisdic-
tion—all of the areas in the long list found in Section 2 of Article III.88 The All
Writs Act does not grant any new jurisdiction.89 It only allows courts to issue writs
in support of existing jurisdiction: “As the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals
is exclusively appellate, its authority to issue writs of mandamus is restricted by
statute to those cases in which the writ is in aid of that jurisdiction.”90 
While intermediate appellate courts can hear a broad range of subjects, Congress
has limited their appellate jurisdiction over those subjects to appeals that follow the
final decision in the case, known as the final judgment rule.91 On its face, this rule
conflicts with the purpose of the All Writs Act. Parties invoke the All Writs Act
when a district court issues an order (or fails to issue an order) and the party that lost
on that issue files an interlocutory appeal.92 An interlocutory appeal is one filed
before final judgment at trial.93 The party does this by application for writ of manda-
mus or prohibition with the appellate court.94
Strictly applying the final judgment rule to the All Writs Act would mean that
appellate courts could not hear interlocutory appeals or issue writs related to them.95
About the only time writs would be authorized is if a lower court failed to take action
that a higher court ordered it to take in the disposition of an appeal, and that would be
a rare event.96 But Congress must have intended for appellate courts to have the
power to issue writs in more circumstances than that. If parties had to wait until final
85 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
86 The All Writs Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
87 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Con-
gress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”).
88 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
89 DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 6:2, at 198–99 (6th ed. 2013).
90 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943).
91 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
92 See, e.g., Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 131–32
(C.A.A.F. 2013) (Baker, C.J., dissenting).
93 THOMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
§ 4.01, at 51, 51 n.260 (2d ed. 2009).
94 See KNIBB, supra note 89, § 6:2, at 198.
95 Cf. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382–83 (1953).
96 Cf. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); KNIBB, supra note 89,
§ 6:2, at 198–99.
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judgment to seek a writ, then the All Writs Act would be pretty much gutted. Following
this reasoning, the Supreme Court has said that a strict application of the final
judgment rule in the context of the All Writs Act would frustrate justice: “Otherwise
the appellate jurisdiction could be defeated and the purpose of the statute authorizing
the writ thwarted by unauthorized action of the district court obstructing the appeal.”97
Because a strict interpretation would render the All Writs Act effectively useless,
the Court has interpreted it to include the concept of potential jurisdiction.98 Potential
jurisdiction exists “where an appeal is not then pending but may be later perfected,”99
such that “[a] court of appeals may issue a writ to ensure effective review of a future
appeal.”100 If the court could hear that appeal after final judgment, then it has poten-
tial jurisdiction.101
Once we establish that the court has jurisdiction—the can analysis—then we see
if the court should issue the writ. Congress described “should” as “necessary or ap-
propriate.”102 In the context of writs of mandamus, the Supreme Court has provided
further guidance on the meaning of necessary and appropriate—both of which must
be satisfied.103
Starting with necessity, the person seeking relief must have no other adequate
means available for relief, which often means that he or she will suffer an irreversible
injury if forced to wait until final judgment to appeal.104 The Court does not want man-
damus to be used as an easy bypass of the final judgment rule and the normal course
of appeals.105 Otherwise, parties could file interlocutory challenges with an appellate
court for almost any ruling made by a district court and the result would be piece-
meal litigation.106 Instead, parties must use the prescribed statutory (or regulatory)
appeals process first,107 which often means the final judgment rule must be satisfied.108
Focusing now on appropriateness, the Court looks at two factors. First, writs are
only appropriate when the right to the issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.”109
97 Roche, 319 U.S. at 25.
98 See id.; BAKER, supra note 93, § 5.03, at 66.
99 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603 (1966).
100 KNIBB, supra note 89, § 6.2, at 198.
101 Id. § 6:2, at 200.
102 See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
103 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004). The Court has essentially
changed the statutory language of “necessary or appropriate” to “necessary and appropriate.”
See id.
104 See id. at 380; see, e.g., Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 395–96 (1976).
105 Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) (“[I]t is established that
the extraordinary writs cannot be used as a substitute for appeals . . . .” (citing Ex Parte
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947))).
106 Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam).
107 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1943).
108 But see KNIBB, supra note 89, § 6:4, at 202 (“Even if appeal theoretically is available,
the court may issue a writ where appeal would be inadequate.”).
109 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381 (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).
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This is where the issuing court should look at the merits of the appeal.110 For ex-
ample, if there is a reasonable disagreement on the appropriate outcome or what law
applies,111 a party is invoking a novel or creative interpretation of the law,112 or when
a matter is committed to the lower court’s discretion,113 then the right is not clear and
indisputable and the appellate court should not issue the writ.
Second, the issuing court must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.114 Two areas are clearly appropriate: “The traditional use of the writ
in aid of appellate jurisdiction . . . has been to confine an inferior court to a lawful
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when
it is its duty to do so.”115
On the flip side, issuing writs where there are serious separation of powers con-
cerns may not be appropriate. In Cheney v. United States District Court,116 the Court
suggested that it would not be appropriate to issue a writ when the mandated action
would constitute an unwarranted impairment by the judicial branch of another coequal
branch in the performance of that branch’s constitutional duties.117 As for writs against
the executive branch, the Court appears to have limited the benefit of this deferential
rule to civil cases against the President and Vice President.118 In criminal cases, the
judicial branch is expected to push back against the other branches of government
because the “primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch [is] to do justice in
criminal prosecutions.”119 Therefore, this separation of powers concern is abated.120
II. SOME BACKGROUND ON THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM
Within the context of the problem addressed in this Article, there are three big
differences between the military system and the civilian system. First, military of-
ficials do not have the option of using a secretive grand jury.121 Second, while the
preliminary hearing is ongoing, there is no standing court available from which the
110 See, e.g., id. at 394 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 384.
111 See, e.g., Cheney, 542 U.S. at 395 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112 See, e.g., Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 384.
113 See, e.g., Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam)
(citing Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 666 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
114 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381 (citing Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403).
115 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943) (citations omitted).
116 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
117 See id. at 390.
118 See id. at 384–86.
119 Id. at 384 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707
(1974)).
120 See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1967).
121 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–941 (2012) (detailing the Uniform Code for Military Justice, but
not permitting the use of grand juries); see also Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832).
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accused can seek relief for errors made during the preliminary hearing.122 Third,
courts-martial and military appellate courts have very limited jurisdiction. After addres-
sing these differences in this section, in the next section we will look at the facts behind
the closure in Bergdahl’s preliminary hearing, and then look at a military accused’s
public trial rights and the military appellate courts’ ability to use potential jurisdiction
to issue writs to vindicate those rights, all in the context of Bergdahl’s facts.
In the military, a preliminary hearing is required before charges can be referred to
a general court-martial (this is the most serious court-martial, one that can give out
felony-level punishment).123 To take a case to a general court-martial, the commander
must use a preliminary hearing.124 The commander does not have a grand jury option.125
In the early days of courts-martial, there was no preliminary event at all.126 If a
commander wanted to send an accused to a general court-martial, he simply referred
it.127 In response to criticism that commanders abused this power, Congress reformed
the military justice system to require an independent review of the case, and consistent
with placing a check on the commander’s previously unfettered power, Congress
required a public hearing.128 We will see that the government can close portions of
these preliminary hearings to protect classified information or other sensitive infor-
mation from public disclosure, but on the whole, these proceedings must be in public.
The modern military preliminary hearing is modeled on the federal preliminary
hearing129 and serves the same basic purpose: to determine if there is probable cause
to believe that the accused committed a crime.130 The accused enjoys the same basic
rights found in the federal procedure, including the right to counsel, the right to
cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence.131
There are some differences. The preliminary hearing officer is not a magistrate, but
is instead an impartial, uniformed military lawyer (uniformed military lawyers are
called judge advocates).132 The power to conduct a preliminary hearing is not derived
from the power of a higher court, as we find with magistrates in federal court.133
122 See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832
(2012 & Supp. IV 2016)) (discussing the preliminary hearing).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See generally id.
126 See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 4–6 (1928) (acknowledging that
the appointing authority could merely create a court-martial without any preliminary hearing).
127 See id.
128 U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET 27-17, PROCEDURAL GUIDE FOR ARTICLE 32(B)
INVESTIGATING OFFICER § 3-3(c), at 7 (1990).
129 Id. § 1-1 at 1. See generally Christopher J. Goewert & Nichole M. Torres, Old Wine
into New Bottles: The Article 32 Process After the National Defense Authorization Act of
2014, 72 A.F. L. REV. 231 (2015).
130 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32(a)(2)(A) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832(a)(2)(A)).
131 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32(d) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832(d)).
132 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32(b) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832(b)).
133 See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
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Rather, the power is derived from the commander’s authority to dispose of a case.134
As such, one of the purposes of the military preliminary hearing is to provide an op-
tional, non-binding recommendation to the commander on how that commander
should dispose of the case.135 At the end of the hearing, the preliminary hearing
officer writes a report and that report could contain a recommendation for disposi-
tion.136 After the preliminary hearing, the commander’s general counsel (called a staff
judge advocate) then provides a required—but again, non-binding—recommendation
on disposition.137
Once the commander receives the staff judge advocate’s advice, the commander
can do several things: take no action, take administrative action, take nonjudicial
punishment action, or refer the case to a court-martial.138 There are three levels of
court-martial: summary (a court-martial with limited due process but also limited
punishment);139 special (a court-martial with broad due process rights that can give
misdemeanor-level punishments);140 and general (the felony-level court-martial that
can give the full punishment authorized by law, to include death).141
Importantly, when the preliminary hearing takes place, there is no standing court.142
Courts-martial are temporary proceedings.143 In the Middle Ages, a commander would
convene a court-martial, preside over it, and then go back to his regular business.144
Over time, commanders eventually began to delegate this task to personally selected
representatives.145 The commander would call these representatives away from their
regular duties, refer the case to them, and they would administer the court-martial.146
When the case was over, the court-martial would disband and those representatives
would go back to doing their regular jobs.147
134 See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 407.
135 Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5203, 130 Stat. 2894, 2905–06.
136 Id.; UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 43, at 324.
137 Military Justice Act § 5205, 130 Stat. at 2907–08.
138 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 407.
139 Id. at app. 9.
140 There are now two types of special court-martial. See Military Justice Act § 5161, 130
Stat. at 2897–98.
141 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 816 (2012)).
142 See Pete Williams, How the Court-Martial System Works: Difference Between Military
and Civil Justice Systems, NBC NEWS, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5006458/ns/world_news
-mideast_n_africa/t/how-court-martial-system-works/#.WlztJaJioY0 [https://perma.cc/SRB8
-EBPQ] (last updated May 18, 2004, 6:12 PM).
143 See id.
144 See generally William R. Hagan, Overlooked Textbooks Jettison Some Durable Military
Law Legends, 113 MIL. L. REV. 163, 181 (1986) (addressing some “legends” of the military
law tradition); David A. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV.
129 (1980) (tracing the history of the court-martial from medieval times to the 1980s).
145 See generally Hagan, supra note 144; Schlueter, supra note 144.
146 See generally Hagan, supra note 144; Schlueter, supra note 144.
147 See generally Hagan, supra note 144; Schlueter, supra note 144.
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At its very basic level, that model persists today. A court-martial only comes into
existence when the commander orders that it be convened.148 Most large installations
have a physical courthouse, but the courthouse is just a building.149 Most large installa-
tions also have a military judge who works full-time at that installation, but the military
judge is just a person waiting for a commander to convene a court-martial.150
The commander convenes the court-martial and details the panel members.151
The trial judiciary details the military judge, the staff judge advocate details the pros-
ecutor (called a trial counsel), and the defense service details the defense counsel.152
After announcing the court-martial convening order and the detailing authorities,
poof—there is a court-martial.153 When the trial is over, poof—that court-martial is
disbanded.154 When the next charges on the next accused come up, the whole process
starts over again with a new court-martial.155
That model is starting to break down. Congress has begun the movement toward
a standing court with a military judge who has power even when the commander has
not referred a case.156 Congress has started down this road primarily because the lack
of a standing court causes problems for the parties in gaining access to evidence
prior to the commander’s referral.157 For example, the Military Justice Act of 2016
authorizes the President to promulgate rules for pre-referral proceedings before a
military judge or military magistrate to deal with issues related to subpoenas, warrants
for electronic communications, and pre-referral matters that are referred by an appel-
late court.158 The President may also now prescribe regulations that allow military
148 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 504. Commanders who are
authorized by statute to convene courts-martial are called courts-martial convening authorities.
See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 22(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 822(a) (2012)).
149 See, e.g., Philip Jankowski, Fort Hood Adds Barriers to Courthouse in Preparation
for Hasan Court Martial, KILLEEN DAILY HERALD (May 3, 2013), http://kdhnews.com/mili
tary/hasan_trial/fort-hood-adds-barriers-to-courthouse-in-preparation-for-hasan /article_a667
e478-b3ac-11e2-860f-001a4bcf6878.html [https://perma.cc/XR72-5Q98].
150 See, e.g., Eastern Judicial Circuit, U.S. MARINE CORPS, http://www.mcieast.marines
.mil/Staff-Offices/Eastern-Judicial-Circuit/ [https://perma.cc/M782-SQMP] (last visited
Feb. 21, 2018).
151 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 22, 25 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 822, 825 (2012)).
152 See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 26(c), 27 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 826(a),
(c), 827 (2012)).
153 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 22–25 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 822–825 (2012)).
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See generally Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, §§ 5001–5542, 130
Stat. 2894, 2894–968.
157 See generally MILITARY JUSTICE REVIEW GRP., MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 2016:
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS 8–9, http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/01
-General_Information/13_MJRG_MilitaryJusticeAct_2016_SecAnalysis.pdf [https://perma
.cc/K2S9-2WT9] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
158 Military Justice Act § 5202, 130 Stat. at 2904–05.
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judges to hear matters after the point where the court-martial historically would have
disbanded, allowing post-trial motions before the military judge enters judgment.159
These changes do not affect the problem addressed in this Article, though. Con-
gress has not yet authorized military judges to handle issues arising from preliminary
hearings. For now, if there is an issue with the preliminary hearing, the parties do
not have a standing trial-level court available from which to seek relief.160 This is
unlike the federal system, where a magistrate’s ruling to close a preliminary hearing
could be referred immediately to the district court.161 In fact, in the military, there
might not ever be a court available if the commander decides not to refer the case.
If the commander does decide to refer the case, then the parties can litigate issues
related to the preliminary hearing before the military judge.162 The accused would
generally first make an objection during the preliminary hearing to the preliminary
hearing officer163 and then object to the preliminary hearing officer’s report.164 Failure
to object constitutes waiver absent good cause shown.165 With the preserved objec-
tion, the accused can file a motion for appropriate relief to correct defects in the
preliminary hearing.166
If the military judge agrees that there was an error at the preliminary hearing,
the usual remedy is to reopen the preliminary hearing and include whatever evidence
was excluded (or make public whatever evidence was closed).167 Those defects do
not affect the jurisdiction of the court, meaning the court-martial continues while
those defects are corrected (although sometimes the court-martial is continued until
the defects are corrected).168 The preliminary hearing officer then updates his or her
report and recommendation and the commander makes a different disposition de-
cision or affirms the one he or she already made.169
In addition to being temporary, courts-martial also have very limited jurisdiction.
While courts-martial do not have any territorial jurisdictional limits,170 courts-martial
only have criminal jurisdiction171 over a limited set of people (generally, only military
personnel).172 Courts-martial are not even authorized to hear civil actions between
159 Id. § 5321, 130 Stat. at 2924.
160 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 826 (a) (2012)).
161 See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
162 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 601(b).
163 See id. at R.C.M. 405(h)(4).
164 Id. at R.C.M. 405(j)(5).
165 Id. at R.C.M. 405(k).
166 Id. at R.C.M. 906(b)(3).
167 See id. at R.C.M. 405(j)(5).
168 Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5203, 130 Stat. 2894, 2905–06.
169 Id.
170 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 5 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 805 (2012)).
171 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 3, 17 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 803, 817 (2012)).
See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 18–20 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 818–20
(2012)).
172 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 2 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2012)).
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service members173 or complaints raised by service members against their command-
ers.174 Courts-martial only hear criminal complaints made by a commander against
a military accused.
This also means that the only parties involved in the criminal action are the United
States and the accused. Here again, that model has started to break down a bit. As part
of the reform efforts related to the military’s perceived mishandling of sexual assault
cases and poor treatment of sexual assault victims, either Congress or the President has
given victims the right to an attorney,175 the right to present information to the prelimi-
nary hearing officer,176 and the right to be heard on evidentiary issues during the court-
martial.177 But that is it. Congress and the President have not opened courts-martial
up to anyone else. Even with those reforms, courts-martial have very limited jurisdic-
tion to handle disputes between anyone other than the United States or the accused.
Once the court-martial is complete,178 the case can move through the military’s
robust appellate system. The system has three appellate levels. First, each service
has a Court of Criminal Appeals.179 These are Article I legislative courts where the
judges are judge advocates with limited tenure (they are usually appointed for three-
year terms).180 Generally speaking, the accused has a right to appeal all cases with a
sentence that includes more than six months confinement or a punitive discharge.181
Next is the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF), also an Article I legis-
lative court but with civilian judges appointed to fifteen-year terms.182 With minor
exceptions, CAAF is a discretionary court. Above the military appellate courts is the
Supreme Court.183
173 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 139 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 939 (2012))
(discussing the alternative process for resolving property claims).
174 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 138 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 938 (2012)).
175 10 U.S.C. § 1044 (2012).
176 Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5203, 130 Stat. 2000, 2905–06.
177 See, e.g., Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 534(c), 128 Stat. 3292, 3367; MIL. R. EVID.
412(c)(2) (2012) (granting the alleged victim in a sex offense case a “reasonable opportunity
to attend and be heard”); see also LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364, 370 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (hold-
ing that to be “heard” includes the opportunity for the victim’s counsel to make arguments
before the court-martial).
178 Military appellate courts are also bound by the final judgment rule. Uniform Code of
Military Justice arts. 62, 66(b), 67(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 862, 866(b), 867(a) (2012)).
179 Military Justice Act § 5330, 130 Stat. at 2932–34.
180 See id.
181 Cases that involve death, a punitive discharge, or confinement for two years or more re-
ceive an automatic appeal. The accused can choose direct review of cases with confinement
of more than six months, and can petition for discretionary review of cases with six months
or less of confinement. See id. §§ 5329–5330, 130 Stat. at 2930–34. Except in cases of death,
the accused may waive these appeals. See id. § 5325, 130 Stat. at 2928.
182 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 142 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 942 (2012)).
183 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 67a(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 867a(a) (2012)).
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Unlike Article III courts (or even other legislative courts that hear criminal ap-
peals, like federal territorial courts) that have broad jurisdiction to hear subjects like
civil actions, military appellate courts have very limited jurisdiction. To start, they
only review courts-martial, which are already proceedings with very limited jurisdic-
tion: criminal complaints made against a very narrow population.184 Next, Congress
has limited the appellate jurisdiction of military appellate courts: the Courts of
Criminal Appeals and CAAF “may act only with respect to the findings and sen-
tence [of the court-martial].”185
In Clinton v. Goldsmith, the Supreme Court spoke about this narrow grant of
jurisdiction. Major Goldsmith had been sentenced to six years in confinement and
to forfeit $2,500 of his pay per month for that period; however, he was not sentenced
to a punitive discharge.186 During the period of his confinement, the Air Force Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence.187 Had he been sentenced
to a punitive discharge, his discharge would have become effective at that point, he
would have been dropped from the rolls, and his pay would have stopped.188 How-
ever, because he was not sentenced to a punitive discharge, he continued to remain
an officer in the Air Force and he was set to receive his regular monthly pay—minus
the forfeitures—for the duration of his confinement.189
Also during this period, Congress gave the President the authority to drop of-
ficers from the rolls that were in Goldsmith’s situation,190 effectively cutting off that
flow of money to Goldsmith. The Air Force notified Goldsmith that it was going to
drop him from the rolls and Goldsmith filed a writ petition with the Air Force Court
of Criminal Appeals.191 That court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear his
claim, so he filed a writ petition with the next higher court, CAAF.192
CAAF held that it had jurisdiction to act on Goldsmith’s petition. In overarching
language, CAAF reasoned that “Congress intended for this Court to have broad re-
sponsibility with respect to administration of military justice.”193 More narrowly,
184 See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
185 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 66(c) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012)) (re-
numbered to § 866(d)(1) in Military Justice Act § 5330, 130 Stat. at 2933); Uniform Code of
Military Justice art. 67(c) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 867(c) (2012)).
186 526 U.S. 529, 531–32 (1999).
187 Id. at 532.
188 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 1003(b)(2), 1003(b)(8).
189 See Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 531–32.
190 Id. at 532.
191 See id. It is well settled that military appellate courts have power under the All Writs
Act to issue writs. See, e.g., Thomas M. Rankin, The All Writs Act and the Military Judicial
System, 53 MIL. L. REV. 103 (1971) (discussing the Court of Military Appeals’s regular issu-
ance of writs under the Act); Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and the All Writs Act, 17
GREEN BAG 2D 191 (2014) (discussing how the Supreme Court has upheld the Court of
Military Appeals’s grant of habeas corpus).
192 See Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 532–33.
193 Goldsmith v. Clinton, 48 M.J. 84, 86–87 (C.A.A.F. 1998).
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CAAF reasoned that its jurisdiction extended to the sentence of a court-martial and
this amendment sure looked like a form of punishment.194 For example, if the mili-
tary kept Goldsmith in confinement beyond the terms of his sentence, then surely
the court had jurisdiction to order his release.195 Here, by dropping Goldsmith from
the rolls, the government was essentially giving him a new punishment of 100% for-
feitures, which was not part of his original sentence.196 The court rejected the govern-
ment’s argument that this action was purely administrative and not punitive in
nature, and held that “in order fully to accomplish the purposes of the Ex Post Facto
and Double Jeopardy Clauses, we should treat this amendment as punitive and hold
that it cannot be applied to Major Goldsmith.”197
The Supreme Court disagreed and specifically rejected CAAF’s assertion that
Congress intended for it to play a large role in the administration of military justice.198
According to the Court, Congress never gave military appellate courts that authority.199
The Court stated, “We have already seen that the CAAF’s independent statutory
jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed” to acting only on the findings and sentence
of courts-martial.200 The Court’s real disagreement with CAAF, and what was dis-
positive in the case, was the Court’s characterization of the post-trial action.201 The
Court characterized the pending drop from rolls as an executive action and not part
of the sentence.202 No one had formally or directly tried to alter the judgment of the
court-martial; rather, another agency had simply taken independent, administrative
action against Goldsmith.203 Because this was an administrative rather than a punitive
action, this issue was beyond the scope of CAAF’s jurisdiction.204
Had the Court characterized the action as de facto punishment (as CAAF had),
then the Court would have found that CAAF had jurisdiction. But the Court took a
narrow, de jure approach, looking to the start and finish lines of the court-martial
process.205 If an action formally falls outside of those lines, then it is not part of the
findings and sentence.206 But if an action falls within those lines, then the reasoning
in Goldsmith is consistent with military appellate courts having jurisdiction over that
action. Indeed, in the subsequent case of United States v. Denedo,207 the Supreme
194 See id. at 87, 90.
195 See id. at 87.
196 See id. at 90.
197 Id.
198 See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534 (1999).
199 See id. at 536.
200 Id. at 535.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See id. at 536.
204 See id. at 535.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 556 U.S. 904 (2009).
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Court found that CAAF did have jurisdiction over a writ of coram nobis filed several
years after the appellant’s military appellate process had been exhausted.208 There,
the petitioner was seeking to modify his actual conviction based on an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim rather than attacking a post-conviction administrative
matter.209 That action—his conviction—fell within the start and finish lines of the
court-martial process.210
Again, there are three big differences that set the stage for this recurring Bergdahl
Block problem. Elsewhere in the federal system, if prosecutors want to keep informa-
tion hidden from the public, they have the option of using a grand jury.211 Military
prosecutors do not have that option, so if they want to keep information hidden from
the public, they need to try to close the preliminary hearing.212 In the federal system,
while the preliminary hearing is ongoing, there are standing courts that have jurisdiction
over criminal law as well as other subjects.213 In the military justice system, there is no
standing court while the preliminary hearing is ongoing from which the parties can
seek relief for errors made during the preliminary hearing.214 In the federal system, the
district courts’ decisions are reviewed by Article III appellate courts with broad
subject matter jurisdiction (but limited appellate jurisdiction).215 In the military justice
system, courts-martial and military appellate courts have very limited jurisdiction.
III. THE FACTS BEHIND BERGDAHL’S BLOCK
We have now looked at the structure and law that governs open trial rights and
writs in the federal system, and the basic structure of the military system. Next, we
will look at the facts in Bergdahl’s case. With those facts in mind, we will then look
at the law that governs open trial rights and writs in the military justice system.
Again, Bergdahl’s defense team was trying to counter the narrative that Bergdahl
was a coward and Americans died looking for him.216 They hoped to do this by making
public two documents that suggested that Bergdahl’s mental health problems caused
him to leave his base rather than cowardice, that he acted admirably while in cap-
tivity, and that no one died looking for him.217
208 Id. at 912, 914–15.
209 See id. at 907–08.
210 See id. at 914.
211 See discussion supra Section I.A.
212 See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 30–35 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 830–835
(2012 & Supp. IV 2016)).
213 See discussion supra Section I.A.
214 See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832).
215 See discussion supra Section I.A.
216 See generally THE BERGDAHL DOCKET, https://bergdahldocket.wordpress.com [https://
perma.cc/WFY2-HFNU] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (providing documents related to Bergdahl’s
legal battles).
217 See Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Oct. 8, 2015).
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On March 25, 2015, the convening authority issued a protective order for per-
sonally identifiable information and sensitive information that might be found in
documents related to the case.218 The defense assumed that the report and transcript
fell within this order and, prior to the preliminary hearing, asked the convening
authority to release them minus any redactions that would be necessary to protect
that information.219
The convening authority apparently construed this as a FOIA request that the
defense was making on behalf of the public (the defense already had the copy of the
report—they did not need to request it through FOIA).220 The convening authority
then denied the request, saying he did not have the authority (presumably under
FOIA) to release the documents.221 The lead prosecutor also emailed the defense,
cautioning the defense to not release any documents.222 The lead prosecutor con-
ceded that the defense could present any information that it desired at the hearing,
but also indicated that the government was interpreting the public release of this
information as a FOIA problem rather than a public trial rights problem.223 The
defense renewed these requests just a few days before the preliminary hearing,224
and the staff judge advocate again said that the convening authorities did not have
the authority to release the information and referenced another memo where a con-
vening authority said he would follow the required rules before closing the prelimi-
nary hearing.225
Anticipating access problems at the upcoming Article 32 hearing, representa-
tives of the media also corresponded with the convening authority, asking for a set
of procedures that would ensure they had access to documents.226 In a short response,
the convening authority said that if portions of the hearing were closed, that would
218 See Memorandum from LTC Peter Q. Burke, U.S. Army (Mar. 25, 2015) (on file with
author) (subject line entitled: “Protective Order for Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
and Sensitive Information—United States v. Sergeant Bergdahl”).
219 See Memorandum from LTC Franklin D. Rosenblatt, U.S. Army, to LTC Peter Q.
Burke, U.S. Army (Apr. 2, 2015) (on file with author).
220 See Memorandum from LTC Peter Q. Burke, U.S. Army, to LTC Franklin D.
Rosenblatt, U.S. Army, et al. (Apr. 8, 2015) (on file with author).
221 See id.
222 See Email from MAJ Margaret V. Kurz, U.S. Army, to LTC Franklin D. Rosenblatt,
U.S. Army (June 15, 2015, 4:20 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter Kurz-Rosenblatt Email].
223 See id.
224 See Email from Eugene Fidell to LTC Peter Q. Burke, U.S. Army (Sept. 14, 2015, 8:59
AM) (on file with author); Memorandum from LTC Franklin D. Rosenblatt, U.S. Army, to
GEN Robert B. Abrams, U.S. Army (Sept. 13, 2015) (on file with author).
225 See Memorandum from COL Vanessa A. Berry, U.S. Army, to LTC Franklin D.
Rosenblatt, U.S. Army (Sept. 15, 2015) (on file with author).
226 Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Nature of a Writ of Mandamus and Brief in
Support at 3, Hearst Newspapers, LLC v. Abrams, ARMY MISC 20150652, 2015 WL
6119474 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Petition for Extraordinary Relief].
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be because the government determined that the closure met the required tests.227 The
convening authority did not provide any analysis of any particular issues and did not
establish any mechanism for releasing information.228 Representatives for the media
also renewed their request days before the hearing and received the same response
from the staff judge advocate that the accused received.229
The military preliminary hearing occurred on September 17 and 18, 2015.230
There, the report summary and the transcript were introduced into evidence and the
information that formed the contents of those reports was discussed extensively.231
The defense team again requested that the documents be made public, but the
preliminary hearing officer refused to do so, saying he lacked the authority to release
them.232 Neither the preliminary hearing officer nor the convening authorities
provided an explanation for the particular closure.233
Because there was no standing trial-level court available, the defense then filed
a writ petition with the Army Court of Criminal Appeals asking it to order the con-
vening authority to release the documents.234 Representatives of the media also filed
a writ petition asking the appellate court to order the convening authority or the
preliminary hearing officer to release the reports.235 The Army court found that it did
not have jurisdiction to issue the writs and agreed with the government’s position
that Bergdahl and the media should seek relief through FOIA.236
IV. A MILITARY ACCUSED’S RIGHTS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF WRITS
With those facts, and with the three military differences in mind (no grand jury,
no standing courts, and very limited jurisdiction), we can head into the main analysis
of open trial rights and the availability of writs within the military. As we do, we need
to keep distinct the analysis that is appropriate for the accused from the analysis that
is appropriate for the media.
227 See Letter from LTC Peter Q. Burke, U.S. Army, to Diego Ibarguen, Hearst Corp.
(Aug. 6, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter Burke-Ibarguen Letter].
228 See id.
229 See Petition for Extraordinary Relief, supra note 226, at 3.
230 See Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2015).
231 See id.
232 See Record of Preliminary Hearing Under Article 32, supra note 5, at 228.
233 See id.
234 See Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1.
235 See Petition for Extraordinary Relief, supra note 226. See generally Bergdahl v. Burke
(Amicus), CTR. FOR CONST. RTS., https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/bergdahl
-v-burke-amicus [https://perma.cc/H5YP-MEE3] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (discussing the
Center for Constitutional Rights’s media petition).
236 See Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *3–5; Hearst Newspapers, LLC v. Abrams,
ARMY MISC 20150652, 2015 WL 6119474 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (per curiam).
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That said, both the accused and the media have public trial rights, and the analy-
sis of whether the military can close a hearing (which might infringe on those rights)
is the same regardless of whose right is infringed. This analysis is pretty much the
same as that found in the civilian system. However, the analysis for who can file a
writ (the accused versus the media) if a public trial right is injured is very different.
If a court applies the analysis required for the accused to the media, or for the media
to the accused, the court will arrive at the wrong answer.
A. An Accused’s Right to an Open Article 32
The accused’s right to an open preliminary hearing is essentially the same as
that found in the civilian system. According to military case law, the accused’s Sixth
Amendment right to an open trial extends to the preliminary hearing.237 That makes
sense. This hearing was modeled on the federal preliminary hearing and the Sixth
Amendment attaches to those.238 The hearing functions like a trial (the accused has
already been charged, it is used to evaluate the weight of the evidence, and it includes
the presentation of evidence and cross-examination of witnesses),239 access by the
public provides an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power (a power
that, prior to 1950, the public believed had been abused),240 and the system has a tra-
dition of allowing access to these hearings.241
Still, there are a few significant differences between this hearing and the federal
preliminary hearing. For example, the presiding officer is a judge advocate rather
than a magistrate, and the hearing officer’s recommendation on case disposition is
not binding on the convening authority.242 But, as the Supreme Court has said with
respect to the civilian system, those kinds of differences should not matter.243 Those
features do not make public access any less essential. The critical features remain:
the military preliminary hearing could be the final and most important step in the
criminal proceeding, and in many cases, would provide the sole occasion for the
public to observe the military justice system.
237 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2013);
ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
238 See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 129–31 and accompanying text.
240 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986).
241 See, e.g., San Antonio Express-News v. Morrow, 44 M.J. 706, 709–10 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 1996); Theodore Essex & Leslea Tate Pickle, A Reply to the Report of the Commission
on the 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (May 2001)—“The Cox
Commission,” 52 A.F. L. Rev. 233, 235 (2002) (discussing how the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, a Congressional military justice reform in 1951, began providing for public hearings
in Article 32 hearings).
242 See supra notes 132, 135 and accompanying text.
243 See Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 13 (acknowledging “the importance of public access to
a preliminary hearing”).
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While no statute formalizes the right to an open hearing, the President has pro-
tected that right in Rule for Courts-Martial 405: “Preliminary hearings are public
proceedings and should remain open to the public whenever possible.”244 The
President further set out the same tests for closure that we find in the civilian courts.245
The convening authority or the preliminary hearing officer can close the proceedings
“if an overriding interest exists that outweighs the value of an open preliminary hear-
ing.”246 Further, “[a]ny closure must be narrowly tailored to achieve the overriding
interest that justified the closure” and “no lesser methods short of closing the prelimi-
nary hearing can be [available] to protect the overriding interest in the case.”247
The rule provides examples of what constitutes an overriding interest: “prevent-
ing psychological harm or trauma to a child witness or an alleged victim of a sexual
crime, protecting the safety or privacy of a witness or alleged victim, protecting
classified material, and receiving evidence where a witness is incapable of testifying
in an open setting.”248 These reasons are also consistent with reasons for closure that
we find in the civilian model, although the discussion only lists the reasons that the
government seeks closure and does not list the reason why the accused would seek
closure—namely, to avoid bad publicity related to inadmissible evidence.249
The President also listed a specific process that must follow when closing the
hearing: “If a convening authority or preliminary hearing officer believes closing the
preliminary hearing is necessary, the convening authority or preliminary hearing
officer must make specific findings of fact in writing that support the closure. The
written findings of fact must be included in the report of preliminary hearing.”250
When we apply these rules to Bergdahl’s preliminary hearing, he had a right to
an open hearing. That right can be constrained, though: the government can close por-
tions of the hearing under certain circumstances. So, we should expect to see that the
government followed the correct procedures: the convening authority or the prelimi-
nary hearing officer would have made specific findings of fact, in writing, that closure
was necessary. Those findings of fact would show that an overriding interest existed
that outweighed the value of an open preliminary hearing. Those findings of fact
would also show that the closure was narrowly tailored to achieve that overriding
interest, and that no lesser methods short of closing the preliminary hearing, like re-
dacting the sensitive information, were available to protect that overriding interest.
However, neither the convening authority nor the preliminary hearing officer
complied with the President’s mandate.251 Neither made specific findings of fact in
244 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(i)(4).
245 See Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 13–14.
246 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(i)(4).
247 Id. Before the President promulgated this rule, very similar tests were set out in ABC,
Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
248 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(i)(4).
249 See id.
250 Id.
251 See generally Memorandum from LTC Mark A. Visger, U.S. Army, to Commander,
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writing that supported the closure and nothing was included in the report of the pre-
liminary hearing.252 The closest thing we have is a letter from the special court-martial
convening authority to a member of the press where he promises, if he closes parts
of the hearing, to follow the rules,253 a letter from the general court-martial convening
authority’s staff judge advocate where she says the special court-martial convening au-
thority has already taken care of the issue,254 and a statement during the hearing by the
preliminary hearing officer that he did not have the authority to open the hearing.255
Getting past that procedural failure, even if military officials had complied with
the rules, it would have been difficult to justify closing the entire report rather than
using a lesser method short of complete closure, like redacting those portions that
contained sensitive information. This is particularly true considering that much of
the contents of the report had already been discussed during the preliminary hearing
through the testimony of the officer who wrote the report and conducted the inter-
view that formed the basis of the transcript.
B. Issuing Writs to Protect an Accused’s Rights at the Article 32
The question then becomes, when military officials fail to comply with the Presi-
dent’s mandate, what can the accused do about that? Again, for courts to issue writs
before final judgment, they need potential jurisdiction and the writ must be necessary
and appropriate.
1. Potential Jurisdiction
Looking first at whether military appellate courts can issue writs to protect the
accused’s Sixth Amendment rights at an Article 32 hearing, military appellate courts
do have potential jurisdiction to issue these writs. The law is pretty clear that the
closure of hearings, to include Article 32 hearings, can potentially impact the findings
and sentence of the court-martial.256
Without providing detailed discussion about why it has potential jurisdiction,
CAAF has repeatedly demonstrated that it does. In ABC, Inc. v. Powell,257 the highest
ranking enlisted member of the Army, Sergeant Major of the Army Gene McKinney,
was accused of sexual misconduct with junior service members.258 The convening
authority ordered that the entire Article 32 hearing be closed to ensure due process
Special Troops Battalion, U.S. Army (Oct. 5, 2015), https://bergdahldocket.files.wordpress.com
/2016/03/article203220preliminary20hearing20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWP6-DMDZ].
252 See id. (containing no mention of closure).
253 Burke-Ibarguen Letter, supra note 227.
254 Kurz-Rosenblatt Email, supra note 222.
255 Record of Preliminary Hearing Under Article 32, supra note 5, at 228.
256 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
257 47 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
258 Id. at 364.
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for the accused, to prevent publicity of potentially inadmissible evidence, and to pro-
tect the privacy of the victims.259
The media and the accused joined in a writ petition that went directly to CAAF
(skipping the Army Court of Criminal Appeals).260 Importantly, in ABC, the writ pe-
tition was submitted while the Article 32 was ongoing—at that point in the process,
there was no trial-level court available.261 The court assumed, without providing
reasoning, that it had jurisdiction to hear the accused’s Sixth Amendment claim and
even said that it could hear the media’s First Amendment claim.262 The court then
granted the writ, reasoning that the convening authority had not made a case for
closing the entire hearing rather than just particular moments.263
Later, in Center for Constitutional Rights v. United States (CCR),264 the CAAF
affirmed that it has potential jurisdiction to issue a writ when the accused makes a
writ request by himself or joins the media’s request.265 CCR dealt with another high-
profile case: the Private First Class Manning court-martial, where Private First Class
Manning was charged with providing classified information to Wikileaks.266 The
media sought a writ to order the military judge to release all of the trial documents.267
In contrast to ABC, where the accused was a party to the writ, in CCR, the accused
did not join the media’s writ petition.268
While disapproving the reasoning in ABC that applied to media requests, the
court affirmed in dicta the parts of ABC that applied to an accused’s request while
the Article 32 hearing was ongoing269:
More immediately, the accused in [ABC] joined the media as a
party in seeking a writ of mandamus to vindicate his constitutional
right to a public trial—something which had immediate rele-
vance to the potential findings and sentence of his court-martial.
We are not foreclosing the accused from testing the scope of
public access, but he has not done so here.270




262 See id. at 365.
263 Id. at 366.
264 72 M.J. 126 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
265 Id. at 128.
266 Id. at 127.
267 Id.
268 See id.
269 In CCR, there was a convened court-martial, and the request was for a writ to order the
military judge to release documents. Id.
270 Id. at 129–30 (emphasis added).
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Further, dicta in United States v. Davis271 reinforces that military appellate courts
have jurisdiction to hear writ petitions arising from Article 32s.272 In Davis, the
accused litigated the closure of his Article 32 before the military judge and lost.273 He
did not file a writ but rather raised the issue on appeal after final judgment.274 How-
ever, had he filed a writ petition before waiting for final judgment, CAAF again
stated that it could have heard the petition: “In the event that an accused disagrees
with the military judge’s ruling, the accused may file a petition for extraordinary
relief to address immediately the Article 32 error.”275
CAAF’s repeated assertion that open trial rights trigger potential jurisdiction is con-
sistent with the civilian model.276 The assessment by the public of what is presented
at the proceeding could provide legitimate pressure on a convening authority to take
no action in a case or to use a lower forum like a summary or special court-martial,
and that certainly impacts sentencing.277
And the reasoning in these three cases is perfectly consistent with Goldsmith. Un-
like in Goldsmith, where the executive action occurred after the completion of the ap-
pellate process (the case was completely over),278 in these three cases, the writ petitions
were or would be within the start and finish lines of the court-martial process.279
Looking now at Bergdahl’s case, military appellate courts had potential jurisdic-
tion to act on his petition. Most importantly, he filed the petition.280 This was not an
action brought only by the media. Three CAAF opinions (ABC, CCR, and Davis)
make clear that in that circumstance, military appellate courts have potential jurisdic-
tion.281 And ABC (which as it applies to the analysis of an accused’s Sixth Amendment
rights is still good law) had the same procedural posture that Bergdahl had when he
filed—the Article 32 was ongoing and there was no trial-level court available.282
2. Necessity
The more difficult question is whether military appellate courts should issue
writs in these circumstances. Looking first at necessity, the person seeking relief
271 64 M.J. 445 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
272 Id. at 449.
273 Id. at 446.
274 See id.
275 Id. at 449 (citing the portion of ABC that is still good law).
276 See discussion supra Part I.
277 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 1301(d).
278 See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 531–32 (1999).
279 See Ctr for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 127 (C.A.A.F. 2013);
Davis, 64 M.J. at 446; ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 364 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
280 Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Oct. 8, 2015).
281 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, 72 M.J. at 127–30; Davis, 64 M.J. at 446; ABC, 47
M.J. at 364; see also LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364, 367–68 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
282 Compare Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1, with ABC, 47 M.J. at 364.
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must have no other adequate means available for relief.283 Parties have to use the
prescribed statutory (or regulatory) appeals process first.284 To start the process, the
accused has to make an objection during the hearing to the preliminary hearing of-
ficer.285 If the preliminary hearing officer overrules that objection, then the accused
is in a tough spot. He has nowhere to go for help.
In the military, when the preliminary hearing is underway, there is no standing
court that serves the function that a federal district court serves with a federal mag-
istrate court.286 When this gap exists, the accused only has one option: file a writ
petition with a military appellate court.287 There is no other adequate means avail-
able for relief. The service-level appellate court is the only place to get relief.
This argument recognizes that, once the case is referred to trial, the court-martial
can hear the accused’s claim.288 In that circumstance, the court-martial can serve the
function within the military system that the federal district court plays in the civilian
system. The accused can file a motion with the military judge. Then, the military
judge could find that the hearing was improperly closed, order that a new Article 32
hearing be held where the closed portion is now opened to the public or made
available to the public, order the convening authority to review the new hearing
report, and then have the convening authority either affirm the earlier decision to
refer the case to a general court-martial or make whatever changes to the referral are
appropriate.289 In that case, a writ would not be necessary unless the military judge
first rules against the accused.
One could argue, therefore, that before referral, a writ is not necessary because
the accused can just wait until the case is referred to trial. Indeed, the case might not
ever be referred, and in those cases, what is the harm? The problem with that ar-
gument is that it runs contrary to one of the primary reasons that the right to an open
trial attaches to the preliminary hearing in the first place. The hearing needs to be
open while it is ongoing precisely because of the chance that it will be the last event
in that criminal process.290 If the case is not referred, violations of that right would
283 See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 27–28 (1943).
284 See id.
285 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(i)(7). The rules do not
require that the accused object directly to the convening authority, even if the convening
authority is the one who ordered the closure. The accused always could, though. To preserve
the issue, the accused also needs to object to the preliminary hearing officer’s report. Id. at
R.C.M. 405(j)(5).
286 See generally supra notes 148–59 and accompanying text.
287 See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405 (regarding
the Preliminary Hearing); id. at R.C.M. 1203 (regarding review of a case by a Court of Crim-
inal Appeals).
288 See generally id. at R.C.M. 906 (discussing a variety of motions available for appro-
priate relief prior to trial).
289 See generally id. at R.C.M. 906(b)(3).
290 See discussion supra Section I.A.
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go without a remedy. Part of the criminal justice system or the military justice
system would forever remain hidden from the public.
In Bergdahl’s case, he filed his petition while the Article 32 preliminary hearing
was still active and before his case was referred to trial.291 He already asked the
convening authority and the preliminary hearing officer to open that portion of the
hearing, and they either gave non-answers or said no.292 He filed the writ petition
during the gap where he had no available remedy, except to seek relief from the first
standing court that was available: the Army Court of Criminal Appeals.293 During
that gap, a writ was necessary.
3. Appropriateness
Next, a writ would need to be appropriate.294 To start, writs are only appropriate
when the right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.295 Here, it is clear
and indisputable that the government did not properly close the hearing. The con-
vening authority did not make specific findings of fact in writing that supported the
closure and then include those in the report.296
While the convening authority could have identified an overriding interest for
closure (protecting the safety of witnesses and protecting classified information),297
the convening authority would have had a difficult time satisfying the rest of the
strict-scrutiny tests—particularly the requirement that no lesser methods short of
closing the report be available. The government could have redacted any personal
information or sensitive information that was in the report and otherwise left enough
in the report to show that no one was killed looking for Bergdahl and to show what
Bergdahl’s mental state may have been at the time of the offense.298
Next, the issuing court must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the cir-
cumstances. Two areas are clearly appropriate: “to confine an inferior court to a lawful
exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when
it is its duty to do so.”299 In this instance, the inferior “court” (which here, would be the
convening authority or preliminary hearing officer) had a duty to comply with Rule
for Court-Martial 405(j)(4).300 The President has ordered all convening authorities
291 See Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2015).
292 See, e.g., Report of Preliminary Hearing Under Article 32, supra note 5, at 228.
293 See Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1.
294 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012).
295 See LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364, 367–68 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (discussing the require-
ments for a writ of mandamus); see also supra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 244–50 and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 245–50 and accompanying text.
299 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
300 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(j)(4).
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and preliminary hearing officers to follow this procedure and the officials in this
case failed to do so.301 This is an area where writs are traditionally appropriate.
And in this case, there were no serious separation of powers concerns. Unlike
in Cheney, where the Court cut some slack to the President and Vice President in a
civil case where a writ might have impeded their constitutional duties,302 here we are
dealing with the convening authority and preliminary hearing officer in their narrow
roles within the military justice system.303 As the Court stressed in Cheney, in criminal
cases, the judiciary is expected to push back against the executive branch because
the “primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch [is] to do justice in criminal
prosecutions.”304 Applying the correct analysis, Bergdahl should have prevailed on
his petition. Military appellate courts had potential jurisdiction to hear his claim, and
his need for the writ was necessary and appropriate.
V. THE MEDIA’S RIGHTS AND AVAILABILITY OF WRITS
The media does not have the same availability to seek redress for an injury that
the accused has. The analysis is different and leads to an opposite result. The good
news is that that analysis should not come up often. Most often, the accused will file
the writ petition and the media will join. Or, the media will file a writ petition and the
accused will join.305 If the accused files or joins, the court should apply the more for-
giving reasoning to his claim, and if the accused wins, the hearing will be opened
and the media’s rights will be vindicated through the exercise of the accused’s rights.
However, in rare circumstances, the accused may have a strategic reason for not
joining the writ petition. This happened in CCR.306 As we will see, the danger is that
when the accused does file a writ petition (or joins the media’s petition), the military
appellate courts may take the analysis that is only appropriate for when the media
are filing on their own and then apply it to the accused’s writ petition. That will lead
the court to a wrong answer.
A. The Media’s Right to an Open Article 32
We have seen that the accused has a Sixth Amendment and regulatory right to
an open Article 32 hearing. Likewise, the media also have a First Amendment right
301 See discussion supra Part III.
302 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 389–92 (2004).
303 See discussion supra Part III.
304 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 384 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 707 (1974)).
305 See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 364 (C.A.A.F. 1997). This is because both
the accused and the media have a shared interest in an open hearing. See discussion supra
Part I.
306 72 M.J. 126, 127, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
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to an open Article 32 hearing: “Similarly, when an accused is entitled to a public hear-
ing, the press enjoys [their First Amendment] right.”307 The source of that quote, ABC,
was later called into question by CCR—but not about whether the media have the
right.308 Rather, CCR challenged the holding in ABC that military courts have jurisdic-
tion to hear the press’s complaint.309 That was a writ question (which I will address
below), not a right question. Further, the media (and the public at large) have the same
regulatory right to an open hearing under R.C.M. 405310 that the accused has.311
When the convening authority or preliminary hearing officer closes the hearing, the
analysis for that closure is the same, regardless of who complains about the closure.312
In Bergdahl’s case, the convening authority and preliminary hearing officer failed
to comply with the President’s mandate about what to do before closing a prelimi-
nary hearing.313 The question then becomes, when the government fails to comply,
what can the media do about that?
B. Issuing Writs to Protect the Media’s Rights to an Open Article 32
Here is where the analysis of the availability of writs to enforce the media’s
rights departs from the analysis of the availability of writs to enforce the accused’s
rights. Again, the media’s right to an open trial comes from the First Amendment
and is embodied in R.C.M. 405.314 When the convening authority or preliminary
hearing officer closes a hearing, the law in the military is also clear that the media
have suffered an injury to their right to an open trial and so have standing.315 Since
the CCR opinion (the Manning case, where the accused did not also join the peti-
tion), CAAF has affirmed that the media would have standing to bring these claims:
“There is long-standing precedent that a holder of a privilege has a right to contest
and protect the privilege.”316
The issue is where to fix that injury. When the media has been injured, where
can the media bring that claim? What court has jurisdiction for that injured party?
When this issue comes up in the civilian context, the courts that handle the criminal
case and any of the defendant’s motions related to that case also have subject matter
307 ABC, 47 M.J. at 365.
308 Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, 72 M.J. at 129–30.
309 Id.
310 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(i)(4).
311 ABC, 47 M.J. at 365.
312 Id.; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(i)(4).
313 See supra Section IV.A.
314 ABC, 47 M.J. at 365. See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19,
at R.C.M. 405.
315 See, e.g., LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364, 368–69 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
316 Id. at 368. To support the assertion that an injured party has standing, the court noted
approvingly that in CCR, that court had assumed that the media had standing. Id.
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jurisdiction to handle the media’s motions related to that case.317 To be sure, the
Constitution and Congress (by establishing Article III courts inferior to the Supreme
Court) grant federal district courts and appellate courts the judicial power over cases
arising under the Constitution—like cases related to the infringement of the public’s
right to an open trial.318
The problem is that courts-martial and military appellate courts, unlike these
other federal courts, have jurisdiction only over criminal law matters, and for the
military appellate courts, they may only act with respect to the accused’s findings
and sentence.319 They do not have subject matter jurisdiction for civilian causes of
action arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States.320
Congress could have granted broader power to courts-martial (as Congress has
for territorial courts)321 and to military appellate courts so they could hear claims
raised by the media, but Congress has not. Congress has not even granted courts-
martial the jurisdiction to hear issues related to other disputes that are recognized in
the UCMJ, like grievances filed under Article 138 for wrongs committed by a com-
manding officer or Article 139 for damage to personal property committed by another
service member.322 Further, as discussed above, Congress has opened the jurisdiction
of courts-martial to hear evidentiary issues raised by a third party in a criminal
trial—the victims.323 Congress has not done that for the media.
That may not be the end of the story, though. If somehow a limitation on the
media’s rights could impact the findings and sentence of a court-martial, then military
appellate courts might be able to take advantage of potential jurisdiction to hear the
media’s claims. We know that military appellate courts have potential jurisdiction
over writ petitions filed by the accused related to the closing of Article 32s because
that closure potentially affects the accused’s findings and sentence.324 The question
is whether the closing of an Article 32, uncontested by the accused, could also
potentially affect the findings and sentence.
Under the current state of the law, the answer is that courts-martial and military
appellate courts do not have jurisdiction over the media’s claims because the me-
dia’s claims do not have the potential to directly affect the accused’s findings and
sentence.325 That is the law. But that law is based on flawed reasoning.
317 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 560–62 (1980).
318 See discussion supra Section I.A.
319 See, e.g., Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 368.
320 See, e.g., id.
321 See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. §§ 1424–1424c (2012) (establishing and describing the power of
the District Court of Guam).
322 See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text; see also Uniform Code of Military
Justice arts. 138–39 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 938–939 (2012)).
323 See supra notes 175–77 and accompanying text.
324 See supra Section IV.B.1.
325 See generally Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
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In CCR, CAAF found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the media’s First
Amendment claims, in contrast to the clear jurisdiction it had over the accused’s
claims (remember, Manning did not join that petition).326 The court stated that it did
not have potential jurisdiction for the media’s claims, but here is the extent of the
court’s reasoning: “We thus are asked to adjudicate what amounts to a civil action,
maintained by persons who are strangers to the court-martial, asking for relief—
expedited access to certain documents—that has no bearing on any findings and
sentence that may eventually be adjudged by the court-martial.”327
But now contrast that to the court’s reasoning that it has potential jurisdiction
for claims raised by the accused: “[T]he accused in [ABC] joined the media as a
party in seeking a writ of mandamus to vindicate his constitutional right to a public
trial—something which had immediate relevance to the potential findings and sen-
tence of his court-martial.”328
Huh? If the information comes out, the public reacts, and that legitimate public
pressure could later affect the findings and sentence, how could it possibly matter
who brought the information to light? The reason that information could impact the
findings and sentence is that the public’s reaction to that information could provide
legitimate pressure on a convening authority to take no action or be more lenient in
a case, which could clearly affect the findings and sentence.
When looking at this jurisdiction problem, the impact on the findings and
sentence does not depend on who sought to make the information public. That in-
formation either will or will not impact the findings and sentence. We care about
who brings the claim when we look at standing, not subject matter jurisdiction.329
That is the law, though: military appellate courts do not have potential jurisdic-
tion over claims raised by the media, but do over claims raised by the accused. We
have this rule because of the faulty reasoning that the information will impact
findings and sentence if the accused brings it up, but not if the media bring it up. We
have this rule simply because the court in CCR said so.
In his dissent to CCR, Chief Judge Baker recognized that the court’s approach
to potential jurisdiction was illogical but did not pinpoint the precise flaw.330 He
noted that this case differed from Goldsmith in that Goldsmith dealt with a post-trial
administrative matter while this case dealt with an issue arising during the course
of trial: “[T]he writ before this Court appeals a specific ruling of a specific Rule for
Courts-Martial in a specific and ongoing court-martial.”331 But he never drilled
down to the critical potential jurisdiction issue: how the media’s claim could impact
326 Id. at 129–30.
327 Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
328 Id. at 129–30 (emphasis added).
329 See LRM v. Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364, 368 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
330 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, 72 M.J. at 130–32 (Baker, C.J., dissenting).
331 Id. at 130.
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the findings and sentence.332 Rather, he thought the majority’s flaw had to do with
timing, which is the issue that potential jurisdiction actually circumvents.333 How-
ever, he did recognize that whatever bad reasoning was afoot, it applied equally as
well to the accused as it did to the media: “Moreover, though the majority claims
otherwise, today’s opinion bars this Court from exercising jurisdiction in an appeal
arising from an accused’s assertion of his . . . right to a public trial.”334
The problem with majority’s reasoning in CCR (whether the information
impacts the finding and sentence depends on who brings it up) was highlighted later
in LRM v. Kastenberg.335 There, Chief Judge Baker now had enough votes to com-
mand a majority and he tried to backtrack on much of CCR without actually overrul-
ing it.336 Kastenberg involved the implementation of changes to the Military Rules
of Evidence that allowed the victim to be heard at trial on certain evidentiary issues.337
The defense objected to the victim’s counsel’s presence or participation in eviden-
tiary hearings.338 The military judge then limited the victim’s counsel from arguing
and found that she did not have standing to file motions to produce documents.339
The victim, through her counsel, then filed a writ petition.340
CAAF found that she had standing and military appellate courts had jurisdiction
over her claim.341 However, strictly applying the reasoning from CCR, the court
should not have had potential jurisdiction to hear the victim’s claim.342 After all, ac-
cording to CCR, it is only when the accused raises issues that those issues can affect
the findings and sentence.343 In Kastenberg, Chief Judge Baker recognized (contrary
to the reasoning in CCR) that issues raised by someone other than the accused could
still potentially impact the findings and sentence:
The military judge’s ruling has a direct bearing on the information
that will be considered by the military judge when determining the
admissibility of evidence, and thereafter the evidence considered
332 See id. at 130–32.
333 Id. at 131 (“Under the majority’s reading . . . rulings regarding public access to courts-
martial are unreviewable . . . because public access issues are raised before the findings and
sentence are approved by the convening authority. Of course public access issues would arise
before the findings and sentence are approved; a public trial necessarily occurs before find-
ings and sentencing.”).
334 Id.; see also Vladeck, supra note 191, at 199–200.
335 72 M.J. 364 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
336 See generally id.
337 See id. at 366–67.
338 See id. at 366.
339 See id.
340 See id. at 367.
341 See id. at 368.
342 See supra notes 328–30 and accompanying text.
343 Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 129–30 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
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by the court-martial on the issues of guilt or innocence—which
will form the very foundation of a finding and sentence.344
In an evidentiary context, it does not matter who litigates the admissibility of evidence.
The result will be a ruling that allows or prevents the admission of the evidence, and
whether the evidence will be considered at trial could impact the findings and sen-
tence. That reasoning does not change when we shift the context from the admissi-
bility of evidence to the public’s access to a hearing.
Unfortunately, rather than overruling the illogical part of CCR, Chief Judge
Baker tried to distinguish it: “Furthermore, unlike ‘strangers to the courts-martial,’
[the media in CCR,] LRM is the named victim in a court-martial seeking to protect the
rights granted to her by the President in duly promulgated rules of evidence . . . .”345
He seems to have finally spotted the problem, but his distinction still does not make
any sense. Abstract victims have certain promulgated rights.346 Those rights are for-
mally vested in a person when she is named in the charging document.347 When those
rights are injured, she gets standing.348 The court has jurisdiction over that issue when
the exercise of those rights could affect the accused’s findings and sentence.349 The
fact that she was named in the charging document has nothing to do with standing
or jurisdiction. Naming her in the charging document simply formally vests this par-
ticular person with those abstract rights.
Compare that to claims made by the media. The media have promulgated rights
(for that matter, constitutional rights).350 Unlike victims, they do not need to be
named in any charging document for those abstract rights to vest.351 As discussed
above, they have standing because their rights are injured. And the court should have
jurisdiction because the exercise of those rights could affect the accused’s findings
and sentence. The problems are not distinguishable because the victim is named and
the media are not.
The problem is that CAAF has created an artificial distinction where none
exists.352 For jurisdiction, it does not matter who brings the information to light.
What matters is if the information could impact the findings and sentence. If the
information could cause the public to apply legitimate pressure on the convening
authority, then that information could impact the findings and sentence. For stand-
ing, it does matter who brings up the issue.353 For example, if the accused does not
344 Kastenberg, 72 M.J. at 368.
345 Id. (citation omitted).




350 See discussion supra Section V.A.
351 See discussion supra Section V.A.
352 See supra notes 346–51 and accompanying text.
353 See generally Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364.
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join the petition, then the media cannot file a claim based on an injury to the ac-
cused’s Sixth Amendment right.354 The military courts would have jurisdiction over
that Sixth Amendment claim, but the media would not have standing to bring it.355 
Again, this situation will rarely come up. We should expect that the accused will
join the petition. When that happens, it is likely that the courts would only address
the accused’s claim,356 and if the accused wins, the media’s issues would become
moot. On rare occasions, like we find in CCR, the accused may have a reason for not
joining the writ and the media will be on their own.357 As the law stands right now,
military appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to hear those claims.358 Chief Judge
Baker could have cleaned up CCR’s reasoning flaw in Kastenberg, but he did not
(maybe it would have cost him his majority?) and this illogical distinction remains
the law.359 As a result, military appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the
media’s First Amendment claims.360 Instead, if the media have suffered an injury to
its open trial right, the media need to go to an Article III court to litigate the in-
fringement of that right.
VI. THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS’S FLAWED ANALYSIS
Fair warning, the reasoning used by the Army Court of Criminal Appeals to
resolve the public access issue at Bergdahl’s preliminary hearing is extraordinarily
confused. Hence, the need for this Article—to prevent opinions like this from occur-
ring in the future. The court could have addressed Bergdahl’s claim on its own,
using the analysis described above, and simply left the media’s claim alone. Apply-
ing the analysis appropriate to the accused’s claim, the court should have granted his
writ petition. With that done, the media’s claim would have been moot. Instead, the
court used the analysis appropriate for the media’s claim to reject the media’s claim—
and also the accused’s claim.
A. The Accused’s Rights and Writs
1. Potential Jurisdiction
The Army Court of Criminal Appeals found that it did not have jurisdiction over
Bergdahl’s claim, using confused reasoning that is inconsistent with established case
354 See generally id.
355 See generally id.
356 This is because the accused’s right to an open hearing is well settled. See discussion
supra Section IV.A.
357 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 127, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
358 See id. at 128–30.
359 See Kastenberg, 72 M.J. 364.
360 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, 72 M.J. at 129–30.
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law.361 The court started off by correctly noting that the court may issue writs under
the All Writs Act, but only on matters over which it has jurisdiction.362 The court also
noted that it has limited jurisdiction: only over those matters that directly affect the
findings and sentence.363 From that point on, the court made several major mistakes.
The Army court set the stage for its reasoning by stating, “[T]he authority of this
court to review pre-referral matters is limited and lacks a firm statutory basis.”364
The first part of that sentence is simply a truism. But we know from case law that
open trial issues raised by the accused based on a closed Article 32 hearing are one
of the matters over which military appellate courts have potential jurisdiction.365 The
last part of that sentence is true, but is true for all cases that involve potential
jurisdiction: there is no firm statutory basis for it. Potential jurisdiction is a court-
made doctrine that is needed for the All Writs Act to have any teeth.366
The Army court then made an odd move, suggesting that because the Supreme
Court in Goldsmith rejected CAAF’s assertion that it had broad responsibility with
respect to the administration of military justice, the Army court should defer to the
Judge Advocate General, staff judge advocates, and convening authorities when
making decisions about pre-referral matters like this.367 According to the Army
court, those people are the ones responsible for overseeing military justice.368
But that is not what the Supreme Court said in Goldsmith.369 The judiciary is re-
sponsible for overseeing criminal justice. Remember, in the lower court decision,
CAAF tried to exercise jurisdiction over an administrative matter that occurred after
the entire court-martial process was over, to include the appeals.370 That administrative
361 I will be citing the unpublished memorandum opinion that the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals issued in Bergdahl v. Burke, a seven-page opinion issued on October 8, 2015.
Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 8,
2015), petition dismissed, 75 M.J. 116 (C.A.A.F. 2015). On October 14, 2015, the court issued
an unpublished two-page summary disposition in response to the media’s petition. Hearst
Newspapers, LLC v. Abrams, ARMY MISC 20150652, 2015 WL 6119474 (A. Ct. Crim. App.
Oct. 14, 2015). While not referencing the earlier memorandum opinion (because it is unpub-
lished), this second, summary disposition clearly rests on the reasoning in Bergdahl v. Burke. See
id.; Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1–2. For example, the court cites to two cases that were
central to its reasoning in the early opinion. See Hearst Newspapers, 2015 WL 6119474, at
*1; Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1–2.
362 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1.
363 Id. at *1–2.
364 Id. at *2.
365 See discussion supra Section IV.B.1.
366 See, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943).
367 See Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *2 (citing Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529,
534 (1999)).
368 See id.
369 Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529.
370 Goldsmith v. Clinton, 48 M.J. 84, 90 (C.A.A.F. 1998); see supra notes 186–206 and
accompanying text.
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matter was beyond the start and finish lines of “findings and sentences.”371 For those
administrative matters, the people the Army court listed might be the right ones to
resolve them. However, here we are dealing with the closure of an Article 32, which
is part of the court-martial process and well within the responsibility of the judiciary
to supervise. If we followed the Army court’s reasoning, we would never second
guess any pre-referral decisions made by convening authorities, but we do all of the
time. In fact, if the case had been referred, the accused could challenge this pre-
referral decision by filing a motion with the military judge, and the military judge
would not grant the convening authority any special deference.
The Army court also tried to characterize the partial closure of the Article 32 as
an executive order, akin to the administrative matter in Goldsmith, rather than “a
judicial order with focused applicability to only the Article 32.”372 We will return
to some of this reasoning later, when we look at whether it would be appropriate to
issue a writ in cases where there may be separation of powers concerns. For now, the
issue is whether a closure of an Article 32 by the convening authority and preliminary
hearing officer by not making the record public is a “judicial” action (bringing it
within the court’s jurisdiction) or an “executive” or “administrative action” (that, ac-
cording to Goldsmith, would be beyond a military appellate court’s jurisdiction).373
According to the Army court:
In Goldsmith, the Supreme Court distinguished between “execu-
tive actions” (where writ jurisdiction did not exist) and actions
effecting the “finding” or “sentence” (where writ jurisdiction does
exist). Although a closer call than the facts presented in Goldsmith,
we find a protective order issued by a military commander, in-
tended to cover the public release of government information
both before and after a preliminary hearing, to be more akin to
an executive action.374
The court came to this conclusion by characterizing Bergdahl’s writ petition as
a FOIA request.375 The court stated, “[T]he matter petitioner desires us to address
371 See Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 531.
372 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *2.
373 Goldsmith, 526 U.S. at 535.
374 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *3 (internal citation omitted). In a subsequent case,
the Supreme Court found that CAAF did have jurisdiction over a writ of coram nobis filed
several years after his military appellate process had been exhausted. United States v. Denedo,
556 U.S. 904, 907–08, 914–15 (2009). There, the petitioner was seeking to modify his actual
conviction based on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim rather than attacking a post-
conviction administrative matter. See id. That action fell within the start and finish lines of
the court-martial process. See id.
375 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *3 (“Setting aside whether this filing is a FOIA
request clothed as a writ petition . . . .”).
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is not a judicial order with focused applicability to only the Article 32 preliminary
hearing. Rather, the order in question is a military order provided by a commander
with application far beyond the Article 32.”376 Somehow, according to the court, if
a commander or preliminary hearing officer issues a broad order that goes beyond
the scope of the Article 32, then the commander or preliminary hearing officer can
trump the accused’s public trial rights that attach to that Article 32.377
That makes no sense. The accused’s Sixth Amendment rights come first. If com-
manders or preliminary hearing officers are concerned about that information becom-
ing public, they must follow the rules to close that portion of the hearing.378 The
official must find that sensitive information needs to be protected and that the
overriding interest outweighs the value of an open hearing.379 The official must then
narrowly tailor the closure to achieve the overriding interest and then make specific
findings of fact in writing that support the closure.380 Whatever orders exist outside
of the hearing have no relevance to this analysis. To trump an accused’s right to make
this information public—a right that comes directly from this hearing—the official
has to follow this process, and none other.381 Simply issuing a broad order before the
hearing does not change the fact that the hearing was closed. To hold otherwise
means a commander could circumvent the public access rules by issuing broad orders
before the hearing that cover everything that might come out during the hearing.
The court then said that Bergdahl should seek relief through FOIA processes:
“[T]he protection provided the contents of the [report], for example, should and
must be sought through administrative channels provided outside the court-martial
process, such as [FOIA].”382 And they suggested if he did not get relief, he should
then go to an Article III court: “This is not to say that as an executive action, the
protective order is not subject to judicial review. Assuming a proper request, when
an agency fails to comply with FOIA, a civil action may be brought against the
agency in a United States district court.”383
That also makes no sense. The court’s analysis shows that it had a patent mis-
understanding of what was going on. Bergdahl already had the report.384 He was not
seeking discovery through FOIA; rather, he was seeking to vindicate his public trial
rights.385 Congress did not write FOIA as a mechanism for enforcing constitutional
rights, but to ensure government transparency in the day-to-day business of running
a democracy: “The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital
376 Id. at *2.
377 See id.
378 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
379 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
380 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
381 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
382 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *2.
383 Id. at *3.
384 Cf. id. at *1.
385 See id.
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to the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and
to hold the governors accountable to the governed.”386
Indeed, the public does not have a constitutional right to the information that is
subject to FOIA requests—the Supreme Court “has repeatedly made clear that there
is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws.”387
That is the very reason why we needed legislation to gain access to it. This is an act
designed to give people access to information that the government could otherwise
lawfully withhold.388 Here, however, we are dealing with a situation where the Con-
stitution requires the government to grant access to the information because the
government chose to put someone on trial.
Telling a defendant that he needs to use FOIA to vindicate his public trial right is
like telling a party who is in litigation with the government, and who is entitled to
information by the Constitution or formal discovery rules, that he or she needs to get
that information through FOIA and not the court process. Defendants do not have to
issue FOIA requests to get access to discovery material.389 That is preposterous. So is
asking defendants to make FOIA requests to vindicate their Sixth Amendment rights.390
The Army court’s reasoning to this point was wholly incorrect. To compound
it, the court then gives an incorrect statement of law: “An Article 32 hearing is ‘not
part of the court-martial.’ An Article 32 hearing, being a hearing conducted before
a decision is made to send a case to trial, is unlikely to have ‘the potential to directly
affect the findings and sentence’ as required for writ jurisdiction.”391 That statement
is contrary to all of the law discussed above: ABC, CCR, and Davis.392
Recognizing this, the Army court tries to distinguish those cases and makes a
critical error. The court failed to distinguish between the analysis required when the
accused files a writ and the analysis required when the media files a writ.393 The
reasoning between the two models is different, as we have seen.
The Army court turned to CAAF’s reasoning in CCR about whether military
appellate courts have jurisdiction over the media’s claims to question whether
military appellate courts have jurisdiction over the accused’s claims.394 The Army
386 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (citations omitted).
387 McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718 (2013) (citations omitted).
388 See, e.g., id. at 1718–19.
389 See generally Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 48 Fed. Reg. 57,461, 57,463, 57,464 (Dec. 30, 1983); Edward A. Tomlinson, Use of
the Freedom of Information Act for Discovery Purposes, 43 MD. L. REV. 119 (1984).
390 See discussion supra Section I.A.
391 Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401, at *3 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Oct. 8, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
392 See generally Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126 (C.A.A.F.
2013); United States v. Davis, 64 M.J. 445 (C.A.A.F. 2007); ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J.
363 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
393 See Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1–3; see also discussion supra Parts IV–V.
394 See Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *2.
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court thought that CCR rejected all of ABC’s precedential value: “However, since
[ABC], the C.A.A.F. has questioned whether [ABC] continues to be good law . . . .
C.A.A.F. in CCR rejected [ABC] as controlling precedent . . . .”395 But remember,
in CCR, CAAF reversed those portions of ABC that applied to the media but kept
in place—and even reaffirmed—those parts of ABC that applied to the accused.396
The Army court then combined an incorrect interpretation of Goldsmith with an
incorrect interpretation of CCR to come to this conclusion: “Viewing [ABC] in light
of Goldsmith, we reject the invitation to extend the jurisdiction of this court under
the All Writs Act to the pre-referral matter raised in this writ.”397
Despite clear case law to the contrary that shows that it did have jurisdiction, the
Army court found that it did not, making several mistakes along the way.398 The
court suggested that it did not have power to supervise the military justice system
on pre-referral actions that occur during the court-martial process, which it does.399
The court suggested that the convening authority and preliminary hearing officer’s
decisions to close the hearing were executive or administrative action, which they
were not.400 The court suggested that Bergdahl’s writ petition was actually a FOIA
request in disguise, which it was not.401 And the court misinterpreted prior case law
by bringing analysis that belongs in the media context to Bergdahl’s claim.402
2. Necessity
While finding it did not have jurisdiction, the Army court assumed for the sake
of argument that it did and continued its writ analysis through the necessary and
appropriate factors.403 Again, the basic test for necessity is whether there are other
adequate means available for relief. The Army court found that Bergdahl did have
other adequate means.404
The court started by saying, “[T]he structure of the military justice system assigns
to others the initial responsibility of addressing the issue presented by the petitioner
[and] this includes the military commander . . . .”405 That is an odd statement. The rules
do not require that Bergdahl petition the convening authority, but he did anyway and
395 Id.
396 Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, 72 M.J. at 129–30.
397 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *2.
398 See id. at *2–4; supra notes 361–97 and accompanying text.
399 See Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *2.
400 See id. at *2–3.
401 See id. at *3.
402 See id. at *2.
403 Id. at *3–5.
404 Id. at *4.
405 Id. at *3.
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was not given any relief.406 In addition, Bergdahl made the appropriate objections
to the preliminary hearing officer.407
The court then argued that Bergdahl should wait until the case is referred to trial,
if ever:
Not only will the military judge be the structurally appropriate
person to consider the questions presented by this writ, the
military judge, having a more developed record, will also be far
better positioned to consider the matter . . . . [W]e again note
that the accused retains the full ability to seek relief at trial from
any error arising from the Article 32 hearing. If a preliminary
hearing did not substantially comply with R.C.M. 405 and Arti-
cle 32, the military judge may reopen the Article 32 hearing or
provide other appropriate relief.408
Indeed, as the court notes, there might not ever be a court-martial.409
Again, the problem with that argument is that it runs contrary to one of the
primary reasons that the right to an open trial attaches to the preliminary hearing in
the first place. The hearing needs to be open while it is ongoing because there is a
chance that it may be the last event in that criminal process.410 And if the case is not
referred, violations of that right would go without a remedy.411 Part of the military
justice system would forever remain hidden from the public.
Fortunately, CAAF’s opinions are consistent with the idea that, during this gap,
issuing a writ could be necessary. The procedural posture in ABC was during this
gap, and CCR validated that part of ABC that applied to the accused.412 Dicta in
Davis also suggests that the accused can file a writ during this gap.413 Here, the
Army court tried to make a completely unpersuasive distinction from this line of
cases: “[T]his case differs significantly from the issues presented in [ABC]. . . . In
[ABC], the news media petitioners were barred access from the hearing itself, and
a remedy given after the hearing had concluded would have been too late.”414 That
reasoning applies with as much force here. A remedy given after the hearing would
406 See supra notes 218–29 and accompanying text.
407 See Record of Preliminary Hearing Under Article 32, supra note 5, at 228.
408 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *3–4.
409 Id. at *2.
410 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1986); discussion supra
Sections I.A, IV.A.
411 See discussion supra Sections I.A, IV.A.
412 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 129–30 (C.A.A.F.
2013); ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 364 (C.A.A.F. 1997).
413 United States v. Davis, 64 M.J. 445, 449 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
414 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *4.
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have been too late for Bergdahl to vindicate his public trial rights. The cases are not
distinguishable.
If “Deny and FOIA” is Bergdahl Block, this is where the appellate court truly
validates that move. Do not seek relief from us. Instead, just wait a few months until
the case is referred and motions are docketed and then seek some relief. In the
meantime, file a FOIA request. Had the Army court applied the correct reasoning,
it would have seen that a writ was necessary to vindicate Bergdahl’s rights, and it
could have foiled this play.
3. Appropriateness
Finding no jurisdiction and that a writ was not necessary, the Army court, for
the sake of argument, continued through the appropriateness prong.415 Again, writs
are only appropriate when the right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisput-
able.416 Of the areas that are clearly appropriate, one is compelling a lower court (or
here, a preliminary hearing officer) it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do
so.417 While it was clear and indisputable that the government did not properly close
the hearing, the court never addressed that issue.418 Instead, the court went to possible,
abstract reasons to close a hearing. Even then, the court used bad reasoning.419
The Army court suggested, contrary to clear line of cases that says that the ac-
cused’s Sixth Amendment right attaches to these hearings, and contrary to a clear
regulatory right to an open hearing, that the public trial rights do not wholly apply to
these hearings: “[P]ublic access to trial documents serves important public interests.
[Access] does indeed serve as a restraint on government, and openness has a ‘positive
effect on the truth-determining function of the proceedings.’ Article 32 hearings,
however, are not an apples-to-apples comparison to trials on the merits.”420 The court
continued: “While an Article 32 hearing is a public proceeding, it is not clear that
the public’s interest in obtaining documents at a preliminary hearing is viewed through
the same lens as the public’s right to admitted documents at trial on the merits.”421
Even when looking at it from the perspective of the media’s rights, as the court did
here, that reasoning is contrary to settled law. The accused’s Sixth Amendment right
(as well as the media’s First Amendment right) clearly attach to Article 32s.422
The court did not seem to recognize that, saying, “A judge-made rule that such
matter is automatically public . . . or is presumptively public . . . would have secondary
415 Id. at *3–4.
416 Id. at *4.
417 See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
418 See generally Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401.
419 See id. at *4.
420 Id. (emphasis added).
421 Id.
422 See discussion supra Parts IV–V.
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effects.”423 Huh? These are constitutional and regulatory rules, not judge-made rules,
and these rules clearly make this information presumptively public.424 Furthermore,
these rules do not create an irrebuttable presumption that this information must
always be made public.425 The hearings can be closed, but the proper authorities
need to follow the rules first.426
The court then looked to a reason for closing the hearing that is generally
advanced by the accused, not the government: that the public might learn about in-
admissible evidence that could then impact the ability of the accused to get a fair
trial.427 Even then, the accused still has to show “that, first, there is a substantial
probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity
that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot
adequately protect the defendant’s fair trial rights.”428 Here, there is no evidence that
Bergdahl’s fair trial rights might have been compromised.
Instead, the court went into the abstract:
Article 32 preliminary hearings are not governed by rules of
evidence. Evidence that would be excluded or suppressed at trial
may be admitted at an Article 32 hearing. An Article 32 prelimi-
nary hearing officer cannot ordinarily screen out documents of
dubious reliability, that are of questionable authenticity, or
whose probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers of
unfair prejudice.
. . . .
With no rules of evidence, and without a judicial officer, such a
rule would allow a party to make public the entire case file so
long as the information was relevant to the purposes of the pre-
liminary hearing. This would allow a party to introduce into the
public sphere information that is inadmissible at trial and whose
evidentiary value may be minimal.429
423 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *4.
424 See discussion supra Parts IV–V; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note
19, at R.C.M. 405(i)(4) (“Preliminary hearings are public proceedings and should remain
open to the public whenever possible.”).
425 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(i)(4).
426 See, e.g., id.
427 Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (quoting Gannett v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979)).
428 Id.
429 Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401, at *4 (A. Ct. Crim.
App. Oct. 8, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
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None of that makes sense. First, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not generally
apply to federal preliminary hearings.430 The same potential problem exists there,
and the public trial right still prevails. Second, the preliminary hearing officers are
military lawyers.431 They understand evidence. Third, a party can introduce the entire
case file—but only if the information is relevant to the limited purpose of the hear-
ing.432 The very purpose of the hearing is to gather information so the preliminary
hearing officer can make a probable cause determination.
Further, the Army court’s abstract reason for justifying the closure of Bergdahl’s
particular hearing would apply equally well to all Article 32 hearings, not just
Bergdahl’s.433 All preliminary hearings have those same rules. The Constitution and
the President have ensured that the accused’s public trial right attaches to the hear-
ing.434 And second guessing those rules is not the Army court’s role. Knowing that,
Congress and the President have allowed the accused to present any relevant evidence,
and the President has said that (with some exceptions) the Military Rules of Evi-
dence do not apply.435 They know the risk that the public will see some evidence that
might not be admissible at trial. And the President (reflecting constitutional consid-
erations) created a mechanism for closing these hearings if that risk is too great.436
Congress and the President established these rules and the Army judges need to live
with them.
Last, and related to the court’s concern about making a “judge-made rule,” the
court hints that separation of powers concerns might make granting a writ inappro-
priate: “Although not phrased as such, the relief petitioner seeks is for this court to
countermand an order given by a military commander . . . .”437 But commanders
issue orders related to courts-martial all the time (or what is litigated most frequently,
they do not grant defense requests for those orders), and the military judiciary does
not treat those decisions with any special deference. Examples include orders to ap-
point expert assistants and witnesses;438 orders to hold depositions;439 orders granting
immunity;440 and orders appointing panel members.441
The reasons military courts do not grant any deference is because, as the Su-
preme Court stressed in Cheney, in criminal cases, the judiciary is expected to push
430 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(e) advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment (quoting FED.
R. EVID. 1101(d)(3)).
431 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(d)(1).
432 Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5203, 130 Stat. 2894, 2905–06.
433 See generally Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401.
434 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
435 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(h).
436 See id. at R.C.M. 405(i)(4).
437 Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *2.
438 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 703(d).
439 Id. at R.C.M. 702(b).
440 Id. at R.C.M. 704(e).
441 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 25 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 825 (2012)).
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back against the executive branch.442 The “primary constitutional duty of the [judiciary
is] to do justice in criminal prosecutions.”443 In Bergdahl, there were no serious
separation of powers concerns.444 This was just a regular court-martial. Unlike in
Cheney, where the Court cut some slack to the President and Vice President in a
civil case where the writ might have impeded their ability to execute their constitu-
tional duties, here we are only dealing with the convening authority and preliminary
hearing officer in their narrow roles within the military justice system.445 The mili-
tary judiciary corrects those officials in those roles all of the time.
Here, if the convening authority or preliminary hearing officer were concerned
about the public release of information, they had a simple solution: follow the rules
for closing the hearing. They did not do so. And the military appellate judges should
have pushed back. That is their job in the system.
The Army court made a mess of Bergdahl’s writ petition, from start to finish.
The law is clear that military appellate courts have potential jurisdiction to hear
these writs, and that during the gap between the close of the preliminary hearing and
the start of the trial, military courts can find that a writ is necessary because there is
no other place for the accused to go for relief.446 And in this particular case, the facts
make it pretty clear that relief would have been appropriate: the government did not
follow the rules, and even if it had, closing the entire report rather than providing a
redacted copy was not narrowly tailored. Providing a redacted copy would have
been an appropriate, lesser means compared to closing the entire report.
B. The Media’s Rights and Writs
The Army court did not apply any real analysis to the media’s claim, but that is
not a great failing.447 As discussed above, while the media have standing for the
injury to their First Amendment right to a public trial when the hearing is closed, the
military appellate courts do not have jurisdiction over that issue.448 In very limited
reasoning, the Army court found that it did not have jurisdiction: “This court does
not have jurisdiction to oversee the administration of military justice generally.”449
The court continued that the media “has not demonstrated that the release of
documents to the public, prior to any decision on whether this case should be
442 Cf. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004).
443 Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974)).
444 See Bergdahl v. Burke, ARMY MISC 20150624, 2015 WL 5968401, at *3 (A. Ct.
Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2015).
445 Compare Cheney, 542 U.S. at 385, with Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *1.
446 See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
447 See Bergdahl, 2015 WL 5968401, at *4–5.
448 See generally Hearst Newspapers, LLC v. Abrams, ARMY MISC 20150652, 2015 WL
6119474 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 14, 2015) (per curiam); discussion supra Part V.
449 Hearst Newspapers, 2015 WL 6119474, at *1 (citing Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S.
529, 534 (1999)).
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referred to trial, has the potential to directly affect the findings and sentence.”450 That
statement would have been a correct statement of the law, except for the middle
phrase. As the law stands, military courts never have jurisdiction over the media’s
claims, before referral or after referral.451
CONCLUSION AND SOLUTIONS
To finish the Bergdahl story, following the denial of the writ petitions by the Army
court, Bergdahl and the media petitioned CAAF.452 CAAF rejected Bergdahl’s petition
in a summary disposition without any explanation.453 The court also rejected the me-
dia’s petition in a summary disposition but included a little bit of reasoning: the writ “is
hereby dismissed for the reasons stated in the decision of the United States Army Court
of Criminal Appeals.”454 As just discussed, the Army court generally got that right,
although its reasoning was only two sentences long and contained a small error.
Note, though, that CAAF did not say the same thing when denying Bergdahl’s
writ.455 The case had not yet been referred456 and so still fell within the period where
a trial-level court did not exist, but likely CAAF was waiting for this to be litigated
at the court-martial (if there ever was one); then, if the military judge denied relief,
the court could wait for a writ to go back through the Army court, all with a well-
developed record. The last time CAAF moved quickly on an issue like this, it
produced the ABC opinion, which it later had to backtrack from.457 The court may
want to take more time this go-around and get the analysis right.
The convening authority referred Bergdahl’s case to court-martial on December 14,
2015.458 At trial, the defense did not file a motion to correct that defect in the Article
32.459 Instead, after the case was referred, Bergdahl chose not to pursue this action
further.460 Ultimately, the Bergdahl Block worked.
450 Id.
451 See Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126, 131 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
452 See Bergdahl v. Burke, 75 M.J. 116 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
453 Id. (“[T]he writ-appeal petition is hereby dismissed.”).
454 Hearst Newspaper, LLC v. Abrams, 75 M.J. 155 (C.A.A.F. 2015).
455 See id.; Bergdahl, 75 M.J. 116.
456 See Luis Martinez, Bowe Bergdahl to Face General Court Martial, Could Face Life
Sentence, ABC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2015, 4:06 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/bowe
-bergdahl-face-general-court-martial/story?id=35761933 [https://perma.cc/PH3R-TBNJ].
457 Compare ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363 (C.A.A.F. 1997), with Ctr. for Constitutional
Rights v. United States, 72 M.J. 126 (C.A.A.F. 2013).
458 Martinez, supra note 456.
459 See Defense Motion to Vacate Pre-Referral Protective Order and for Other Appropriate
Relief (Public Trial) at 1, United States v. Bergdahl (Ft. Bragg Feb. 4, 2016), http://bergdahl
docket.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/4feb16vacate.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5MZ-NCG3]. The
issue is now forfeited on appeal. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M.
905(d).
460 See Dan Lamothe, Army Protests Bergdahl Attorneys’ Release of Documents, WASH.
POST, Mar. 20, 2016, at A8.
2018] THE BERGDAHL BLOCK 837
The media did not even have an option at the court-martial. The court-martial
did not have jurisdiction to hear their claims. To seek relief, the media would have
to file a claim in a federal district court. The military officials did not follow the rules
and the media was left without a worthwhile remedy. The Bergdahl Block worked.
The good news is that if military appellate courts apply the correct reasoning to
claims brought by the accused, the block should not work (although there is still
great inefficiency in not having a standing court available). However, the block will
work against the media in those cases where the accused does not also raise a claim. 
With a few simple fixes, Congress and the President can foil the Bergdahl Block
and design a more efficient system. To start, Congress should amend the language
of Article 32461 and the President should amend R.C.M. 405462 to make clear that the
preliminary hearing officer can process requests by the media (1) to open the pre-
liminary hearing and (2) to provide a process for providing information to the media.
Congress and the President have already crafted rules for another non-party by
giving victims the right to be heard in certain evidentiary issues,463 special provisions
for receiving records related to the hearing,464 and the ability to provide additional in-
formation to the preliminary hearing officer (independent of the prosecutor).465
Clarifying the process for the media is not breaking any new ground and would
provide an alternative means to the media short of filing a writ.
As it turns out, the Military Justice Act of 2016 provides a mechanism for these
changes.466 The Act creates a new article, Article 140a, that is designed to force the
President to come up with procedures to provide victims, counsel, and members of
the public access to unsealed court-martial documents.467 When implementing this
statute, the President should include procedures for releasing all documents related
to the preliminary hearing contemporaneous with the hearing.
Still, military officials might just disregard those rules, as they did with the rules
that governed Bergdahl’s case. Congress needs to create an efficient mechanism that
will hold military officials accountable to the rules. At the very least, Congress
should amend Article 32 to make clear that military appellate courts have potential
jurisdiction over issues raised at the preliminary hearing.468
461 See generally Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832
(2012 & Supp. IV 2016)).
462 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405.
463 See id. at R.C.M. 405(i)(2)(A).
464 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32(e) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 832(e)); MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(j)(5).
465 Military Justice Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 5203, 130 Stat. 2894, 2905–06;
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 19, at R.C.M. 405(k).
466 See generally Military Justice Act §§ 5001–5542, 130 Stat. at 2894–2968.
467 See UCMJ RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 43, at 139.
468 The proposed Executive Order that would implement the MJA contains a provision for
victims that states that they may file a writ if the preliminary hearing officer allows sexual
propensity evidence at the hearing: “If the preliminary hearing officer determines that the
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A more complete and efficient solution would be for Congress to close the gap
between the preliminary hearing and the appellate court. Congress should continue
the movement toward having a standing trial-level court by allowing military judges
to hear issues related to the preliminary hearing before the referral. As discussed
above, Congress has recently authorized military judges and magistrates to hear
certain evidentiary issues before referral.469 Adding these preliminary hearing issues
to the list would not be difficult and would bring the military system more in line
with the federal system. Military judges would act as a district court judge, with the
same relationships to the preliminary hearing officer that the district court judge has
with the federal magistrate. The military judge would be able to hear the issues as
they arise and provide at least one contemporaneous check on the military officials’
decision to close a hearing.
While that would take care of issues raised by the accused, Congress would need
to take an additional step for the media. Congress needs to amend Article 17 (which
governs the general jurisdiction of courts-martial)470 to give courts-martial the juris-
diction to hear public trial claims brought by the media. And Congress needs to
include language in Articles 66 and 67 (the statutes that define the military appellate
courts’ jurisdiction)471 to grant subject matter and appellate jurisdiction over claims
brought by the media related to their open trial rights at these hearings.
Now is the time for change. The last three years have seen arguably the most
significant changes to the military justice system since it came into being in 1951.
These changes have come in large part because the public lost trust and confidence
in the military justice system, particularly for the military’s handling of sexual
assault cases.472 Transparency fosters trust and confidence. The more the public knows
about what is considered at a preliminary hearing and what the commander relied
upon when making his or her referral decision, the more trust and confidence the
public will have in the commander’s decision and, ultimately, the role of command-
ers in making make those decisions.
evidence should be admitted, the victim may directly petition the Court of Criminal Appeals
for a writ of mandamus pursuant to Article 6b.” Proposed Amendments to the Manual for
Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.), 82 Fed. Reg. 31,952 annex 2, at 61 (proposed
July 11, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/07/11/2017-14447/proposed
-amendments-to-the-manual-for-courts-martial-united-states-2016-ed [https://perma.cc
/3SDH-JBYV]. This provision is a memorialization of the ruling in Kastenberg, where CAAF
found that it had potential jurisdiction over the victim’s writ petition. See LRM v. Kastenberg,
72 M.J. 364, 367–68 (C.A.A.F. 2013). The President cannot safely do the same thing for the
media, though. Only Congress (or the courts, by interpreting statutes) can expand jurisdiction.
469 See discussion supra Part II.
470 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 17 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 817 (2012)).
471 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 66–67 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 866–867) (2012)).
472 See discussion supra Part II.
